TURKEY TO-DAY

by

BERNARD LEWIS

With One Map

HUTCHINSON & CO. (Publishers) LTD.
LONDON AND MELBOURNE

1940

DR589
.L47

582521
F3 41

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN,
AT GAINSBOROUGH PRESS, ST. ALBANS,
BY FISHER, KNIGHT AND CO., LTD.

TO MY WIFE

Without whose help and co-operation
this book could not have been written

CONTENTS

		PAGE
PREFACE		5
CHAPTER		
I.	THE TURKISH BACKGROUND	7
II.	TURKEY BETWEEN TWO WARS	18
III.	THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF TURKEY	42
IV.	TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST	54
V.	TURKEY AND THE BALKANS	79
VI.	TURKEY AND THE GREAT POWERS	97
VII.	THE STRATEGIC AND MILITARY POSITION OF TURKEY	124
CHRONOLOGY		128

PREFACE

On October 9th, 1588, Giovanni Moro, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople, wrote to the Doge and Senate of Venice as follows: "When the English envoy went to the Pashas to tell them of the defeat of the Spanish Armada, they replied simply: 'God grant it may be so.'"

. . . . .

To-day once more England is in danger of invasion by a powerful continental enemy, and if again we succeed in defeating the foe that threatens our shores, there will be few in Turkey who will not feel deeply thankful for our victory. And this time there is more between the two nations than a vague feeling of sympathy springing from a hatred of a common enemy. Centuries of friendship have culminated in a Treaty of Alliance, assuring at least the benevolent neutrality of Turkey, and at most full Anglo-Turkish co-operation in a Mediterranean war.

A glance at the map is enough to show the great strategic importance of Turkey. Her geographical situation gives her a commanding position in the Near East. She is the guardian of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and thus dominates an essential channel of communications—a point that was driven home firmly during the last war. Situated between the Balkans and the Middle East, she is able to exercise great influence in both groups of countries, and her military strength and skilful diplomacy have made her the leading power of both the Balkan and Middle Eastern blocs. Though her navy is small, she has a number of valuable ports. Her army is undoubtedly the finest in the area, and her air bases, too, could be of great help.

At a time when the headlines in one's morning papers are apt to look silly by midday, it is unwise to make prophecies. Turkey will enter the war if and when the rulers of Turkey think fit, and it is not for outsiders to judge when that is likely to take place. The purpose of this book is merely to present the chief facts concerning the internal and external development of Turkey during recent years. If it can succeed in making clear to English readers the value and importance of our Ally in the Near East, its main purpose will have been achieved.

London, July 31st, 1940



Reproduced from the Bulletin of International News of February 24th, 1940, by courtesy of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

TURKEY TO-DAY

CHAPTER I

THE TURKISH BACKGROUND

THE word 'Turk,' used in its narrow sense to describe an inhabitant of what is now the Turkish Republic, has in reality a much wider meaning. The Turkish peoples, numbering well over 30,000,000, occupy a vast stretch of territory, extending from the Mediterranean far into Central Asia. The Turks of Turkey thus form the westernmost and most advanced section of a racial and linguistic group, living in every stage of human culture from the civilized and cultivated Constantinopolitans to the pagan nomads of the Siberian plains. Many millions of Turkish-speaking peoples inhabit the European and more particularly the Asiatic provinces of the U.S.S.R. and several of the Soviet republics, e.g., those of the Turkmens and Uzbeks, are predominantly Turkish. The Soviet policy of encouraging national cultures has resulted in a great development of Turkish literature in the Soviet Union, and many books and newspapers are published in the Eastern Turkish languages. These languages are closely related to Turkish as spoken in Turkey, and a certain feeling of kinship exists. Large Turkish-speaking populations are also to be found in Northern Persia and Afghanistan, and in Western China.

According to racial theory, the Turks belong to the Turanian family, of which the Finns, Hungarians and Mongols are also members. It is interesting to note that some years ago pan-Turanian theories were in vogue among Magyar intellectuals, though without serious consequences. Pan-Turkish feeling has made itself felt in Turkish thought and letters, and Turks are becoming increasingly interested in the welfare of their more backward kinsmen.

The origins of the Turks are to a large extent unknown, and in the absence of reliable historical data very little can be said about them. There were undoubtedly Turkish tribes among the invaders of Europe in the last

days of the Roman Empire, and it has been suggested that Turkish elements played some part in early Oriental civilizations. The first appearance of the name 'Turk' in history dates from the sixth century of the current era. From Chinese annals we learn that in that century the Tu-Kiu (Turks) founded a powerful empire in Central Asia, which lasted for some time. These early Turks were by no means barbarians. Already at that date they possessed a written language and a certain culture of their own, and many of them were Christians. The importance of their empire may be judged by the fact that a Roman Emperor sent an embassy to them, and that the Chinese historians devote much space to them.

Like so many Asiatic empires, however, the Tu-Kiu state was short-lived, and in the seventh century broke up into warring fragments. From this time onwards the Turks come into ever closer contact with a civilization with which their destiny was until recently inseparably linked—namely, the Arabo-Islamic culture of the Near East. It was in Turkistan that the Turks first met the Arab Muslim invaders, and were greatly influenced by them. By the ninth century we find the Turks becoming an Islamic people. This contact with the Near East wrought many changes in Turkish life. The first and most important change was the adoption of the Islamic religion, bringing with it a whole new culture and way of life. From the Arabs, too, the Turks adopted Muslim social institutions and habits, many of which have survived into the present century. The cultural impact was no less full of consequence. The adoption of Islam brought with it the use of the Arabic script in writing Turkish, and the borrowing of many Arabic words. The extent of Arabic influence on Turkish may be judged from the statement that there were as many Arabic words in Turkish as there are Latin and French words in English. Turkish literature and art followed Arabic and Persian models. Though such borrowings by one people from another are a necessary feature of cultural development, in the case of the Turks

the process was carried much too far, and the creative genius of the Turkish people almost succumbed under the weight. One of the great achievements of the twentieth century Turkish Republic is the re-creation of Turkish culture, and the purging of unnecessary borrowings. Despite some exaggerations in the earlier years, the change has been effected with wisdom and discretion. Much that is valuable in the Arabo-Persian heritage has been retained, and only those elements that are superfluous or unsuitable have been rejected. The Arabic script, which is utterly unsuited to the Turkish language, has given place to the Latin, the slavish imitation of ancient models that was prevalent among old-world pedants has been abandoned, and a new spirit of creative endeavour pervades Turkish cultural life.

But we must return to our historical survey. Having once entered the Near-Eastern cultural sphere, the Turks did not long remain on its extreme eastern limit. Before long Turks, both as individuals and as tribes, began to enter the central areas of Islam. Turkish soldiers and statesmen played an important part in Arab and Persian affairs, Turks writing Arabic and Persian made an impressive cultural contribution, and by the eleventh century Turkish dynasties held sway over a large area of the Near and Middle East. It is interesting to note that already at the time of the Crusades the Turks formed the chief element in the Muslim armies that opposed the Crusaders.

Having entered the Mohammedan world, the Turks were quick to extend it, and to carry the banner of Islam to lands where it had not flown before. Turkish armies brought Islam to India, and founded the first of the long series of Turkish Muslim dynasties that ruled that country until the British conquest. Far more important was the conquest of Asia Minor or Anatolia. This large and rich province, for long the central bastion of the Eastern Roman Empire, was wrested from them by the Turkish Seljuk tribe in successive stages, and a Seljuk Sultanate was set up with its capital at Konya.

Under Seljuk rule, which lasted from the eleventh to the fourteenth century in various forms, the Turkisation of Anatolia was far advanced. Masses of Turkish immigrants from further east were settled on the land, and a Turkish, Muslim civilization and people replaced Greek Christianity. The Seljuk Sultanate reached a high level of cultural and political development, and it was under them that the main lines were laid down along which Turkey developed for centuries under the Ottoman Sultans.

From this time onward we must confine ourselves to Anatolia, which henceforth forms the chief theatre of Turkish history, and has remained to this day the backbone of the Republic. Many Turks continued to distinguish themselves in Persia, India, Egypt, and elsewhere, but they remained minorities among non-Turkish peoples. It is in Anatolia that the historic Turkish nationality was formed.

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries the Sultanate of Konya fell into decay, and split up into a number of smaller principalities. One of these, in Western Anatolia, was ruled by a certain Osman, or Othmān, from whom the name Ottoman (Turkish, Osmanli) is derived. By its vigour, its energy, and its martial prowess the young Ottoman principality soon marked itself out, and began a steady process of expansion which did not cease until the seventeenth century. The House of Osman was fortunate in having a series of brilliant Sultans in immediate succession, quite unparalleled in the history of royal families. After an initial period of expansion at the expense of their Anatolian neighbours, the Ottomans turned westward, and began a new era in human history. In 1352 the Ottomans seized Tzympe in Thrace, thus acquiring their first foothold on European soil. The event was one of tremendous importance in world history, and is, as may be imagined, embellished with many legends. The Turkish historians say that the Ottoman prince Soliman had a dream in which he saw the moonbeams make a path from Asia to Europe, tempting him to conquest

and glory. He then crossed the Hellespont on a moonlit night with 300 warriors, and seized the castle on the European shore.

Once the Ottomans had succeeded in establishing themselves on the European shore, there was no power in the Balkans that could withstand them. In rapid succession the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians and Hungarians were subdued, and the Roumanians were forced to accept Ottoman suzerainty. Thus a new empire came into existence. Parallel with their Balkan conquest, the Ottomans gradually extended their sway over the other Turkish states of Anatolia, uniting that country once more under a Turkish dynasty and extending the solid Turkish basis on which their empire ultimately rested. It is interesting to note that Ankara, the newest capital of Turkey, was occupied by the Ottomans in 1354, almost a century before Istanbul.

In 1453 Constantinople, the capital of the decaying Byzantine Empire, was captured, and the last bastion of independent Christianity in the Balkans overthrown. Constantinople, henceforth to be known as Istanbul, immediately became the capital of the new empire, and the traditional seat of the Ottoman Sultans until 1922.

In 1517 Sultan Selim destroyed the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and incorporated the Arab lands of Egypt and Syria in the Ottoman Empire, where they remained for four hundred years. The Arab acquisitions of Selim much strengthened the Arabo-Islamic element in Turkish culture.

By this date, then, we can see clearly the main outlines of what we may call the first stage of the Eastern Question—the problem presented to Europe by Turkish strength. By a series of rapid and brilliant campaigns, a new Muslim empire had been established, offering a serious threat to Europe. In the Balkans, the Turkish Janissaries proved irresistible. One Balkan nation after another fell under their yoke, and in 1396 at Nicopolis, the flower of Western chivalry, sent to aid the Eastern Christians, was crushingly defeated. Turkish fleets dominated the Eastern Mediterranean, and disputed

the Western waters with Spain. In possession of both the Dardanelles and Egypt, the Turks commanded the Black and Red Seas, and dominated all communications between Europe and the further East. Europe was by no means united against the Turks. Early in the sixteenth century France sought a Turkish alliance against the Habsburg Emperor, and French and Turkish naval squadrons co-operated in the Western Mediterranean. Later in the century attempts were made to effect an Anglo-Turkish *rapprochement* against the common Spanish enemy.

During the reign of Sultan Soliman the Magnificent (1520–1566) the Ottoman Empire may be said to be at its apogee of power. In three continents the Sultan held unchallenged sway, not only over his own Turks, but over vast subject populations of Muslim Arabs and Balkan Christians. The armed might of Turkey commanded a huge area, and Turkish cities grew in wealth and prosperity. In the cultural and administrative spheres great progress was made, and Turkish architecture achieved a high standard. Many of the beautiful buildings that adorn Turkey and Syria belong to this period.

But already the elements of decay were present in the Ottoman state. The very rapidity and extent of the Turkish conquests served to lessen their value, for the machinery of government that was adequate for a swiftly expanding nation of conquerors was not sufficient to maintain a tranquil and ordered Empire embracing vast territories. An army of occupation is not to be converted in a day into an organized Imperial structure, and the Turks were not given time to consolidate their acquisitions. In the west great changes had taken place. The Renaissance and the Reformation were followed by a period of rapid development in science and culture, and by the emergence of strong, centralized national states with a constantly improving military technique. These developments, and particularly the advance of military science, left Turkey quite unaffected, so that while the Empire was declining in strength through

internal decay, it had to face far stronger and better equipped adversaries than hitherto. Moreover, the discovery of America on the one hand and of the ocean route to India *via* South Africa on the other shifted the centre of international commerce and power from the Mediterranean to the open sea, leaving Turkey in a backwash, doomed to economic and cultural stagnation. And so we reach the second stage of the Eastern Question—the problem of Turkish weakness, and the conflicting ambitions of the great European powers. For some time the very momentum of the Turkish onrush, and the natural vigour of the Turkish people were sufficient to maintain the Empire as a major power, and even in the seventeenth century a second attack was made on the city of Vienna, in the heart of central Europe. But the great days were passed, and by the end of the century the weakness of the once dreaded Empire was manifest. Then began the scramble of powers for pickings of Turkish territory, and for positions of influence in the Empire. During the eighteenth century England and France remained more or less in the background, and were content with certain commercial and diplomatic concessions and privileges. The main interest of the Eastern Question centred on the activities of Austria and Russia, sometimes joined by Prussia, in the Balkan and Black Sea areas. At times these powers collaborated to despoil Turkey, more often they were rivals. Indeed, it was largely the failure of the powers to act together, and their jealous greed of each other's activities, that saved the Empire from complete extinction. It was in their rare moments of collaboration, such as when Austria, Russia and Prussia joined to partition Poland, that Turkey stood in greatest danger. The individual Turkish soldier still fought as bravely and as magnificently as ever, but the Turkish armies, hopelessly outmatched by superior European equipment, and let down from behind by the inefficient staff-work and general disorganization of a ramshackle and decaying empire, could not withstand the invaders. In a series of wars, province after province was wrested

from the Sultan, and conditions went from bad to worse.

In the nineteenth century matters changed considerably. England and France, by now powers with extensive Mediterranean interests, began to take a more active interest in Turkish affairs, and Austria and Russia no longer had things entirely their own way. The general line of British policy was to support the Turks, and the famous principle of "maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire" was adhered to by most British Cabinets throughout the century. In 1854 Britain and France went to war at the side of Turkey in order to check Russian aggression, and in 1877 again England was on the point of war with Russia in defence of Turkish independence. A further complicating factor was the rise of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Empire. One by one the Serbs, Czechs, Roumanians and Bulgarians were affected by the new nationalist fervour that spread from Western Europe, and by their own struggles, with some support from the powers, succeeded in attaining national independence and statehood. Egypt, too, though still nominally part of the Empire, was completely autonomous, and under a virtually independent dynasty, progressed rapidly towards a national state.

Perhaps more important than all these were the first stirrings of a new spirit among the Turks themselves. Already at the beginning of the century one or two Sultans made efforts to reform and modernize the Turkish army, and a reforming and liberalizing tendency is noticeable throughout the century. Most of these early attempts at reform, however, proved abortive, and Turkey sank increasingly under the weight of her own past and of the growing economic and political domination of the great powers. From 1878 to 1908 the country was under the iron despotism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who crushed without mercy every attempt at liberal thought and reform, and who, by stressing the Oriental and Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire, strove to make it the spear-head of an Oriental reaction against the West. His efforts, however, were ultimately unsuccessful. Already in his own reign the movement of literary renaissance progressed rapidly, and a secret body called the Committee of Union and Progress plotted to overthrow the old despotism and establish a constitutional and liberal regime. In 1908 the revolution burst on Turkey, and the Young Turks seized power. They had, however, little opportunity of putting their ideas into practice. In 1911 the Italians, who had long coveted Libya, suddenly presented an ultimatum to the Turks and began what must be regarded as one of the most naked pieces of aggression ever perpetrated by a great power until recent years. Despite the rather limited success of Italian arms, the Turks were compelled to sign an agreement at Lausanne (October 18th, 1912) because of the impending outbreak of another war nearer home. The Italians received full sovereignty over Libya—a right which it took them many years of struggle to impose on the Arab inhabitants of the country, and which they still bitterly resent. They also promised to evacuate the Dodecanese Islands, occupying a vital strategic position just off the Anatolian coast. Of these islands we shall speak later. Suffice it to say now that the Italians are still in occupation of them to-day.

Meanwhile a Balkan alliance of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria was formed, for the purpose of annexing certain parts of European Turkey inhabited by Balkan Christians, and on October 9th, 1912, hostilities began. The Turks, having just emerged from several years of revolution and war, were in no position to meet the allies, and despite a strong resistance were forced to cede large areas. A treaty was signed in London on May 30th, 1913, by which Turkey lost a large part of her European possessions, and an independent Albania was established. Before very long, however, the Balkan allies fell out over the division of the spoils, and in the course of the war between Bulgaria and her former allies, the Turks reconquered part of the ceded territory. On September 29th, 1913, a new Turco-Bulgarian Treaty returned to Turkey part of her loss.

The respite was not to last long, however. The Great War was imminent, and though she had fought almost incessantly from 1911 to 1913, Turkey was about to enter on a new phase of hostilities that did not end until 1922. During the reign of Abdul Hamid, German influence had been steadily increasing in Turkey, and the Young Turk revolution made little difference. The German Kaiser took a special interest in the Near East, and paid a state visit to the Sultan. German officers reorganized the Turkish army, German business men and technicians studied and exploited the resources of the country, and German engineers began the construction of the famous Baghdad railway which, running through the Ottoman Empire, was to provide rail communication between Germany and the Middle East and incidentally to bring Turkey effectively under German domination. Let us quote the Turkish economist, Orhan Conker on German ambitions in Turkey:

"The aims of the German Imperialists in the Ottoman Empire can be clearly judged. They wished first to make of Turkey a vast market reserved for German products and, at the same time, to transform Anatolia into a source of raw materials for German industry. The Baghdad railway was to be their instrument *par excellence* in turning Anatolia into a *Lebensraum* for Germany's surplus population. Turkey was to be lowered to the rank of a vassal state of Germany, pending its relegation to that of a colony."

It was in October 1914 that the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, and on November 23rd of the same year the Islamic clergy issued a decree proclaiming a Holy War against the Allies. The value of the Turkish alliance to the Central Powers was immense. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the subsequent British occupation of Egypt, had brought the route to India back once more to the Mediterranean. The Turks, operating from Syria and Palestine, then still in Turkish hands, were able to offer a serious threat to British Imperial communications, and to occupy important British forces on large-

scale operations in the Middle East. By their control of the entries to the Black Sea, and their successful defence of the Dardanelles, they prevented effective co-operation between Russia and the Western Powers. Their Balkan position assured German supremacy in that vital area, and helped to seal the doom of our Roumanian ally until the final German defeat. Finally, as the strongest surviving Islamic power, Turkey enjoyed great prestige among the countless millions of Muslims in Asia and Africa, and provided a jumping-off ground for German agents in French North Africa, Libya, Iran and India.

It is interesting to note that relations between the Turks and their German helpers were far from cordial. The German officers, technicians and experts who went to Turkey succeeded, by their arrogance and their disregard of Turkish susceptibilities, in arousing vehement protests in Turkish quarters. Military relations were also uneasy, and General Liman von Sanders, the head of the German Military Mission, in his memoirs, speaks of the lack of co-operation and friendly relations between Germans and Turks. The official Ottoman history of the war blames the Germans for this failure to collaborate.

The actual military operations against Turkey during the last war are too well known to need detailed discussion. It is amazing that, with three years of struggle against several enemies just behind it, the decaying Empire was able to put up such a long and bitter fight against powerful and well-equipped allied forces, and to continue even after the German collapse, until 1922. It is easy to see that even in the darkest hour of decline the fighting qualities of the Turks remained unimpaired.

After the two unsuccessful attempts against the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia, the latter culminating in the British surrender at Kut and the former in complete withdrawal, a new attack was launched through Palestine and Iraq. Allenby's armies succeeded in driving the Turks from Syria and Palestine, and in Iraq contingents from India occupied the larger part of the

country. The Salonica expedition destroyed the Turkish position in the Balkans, and deprived her of her Bulgarian ally. The Turks, defeated on all sides, and cut off from their allies, decided to abandon the struggle, and signed an armistice at Mudros, in the island of Lemnos, on October 30th, 1918.

CHAPTER II

TURKEY BETWEEN TWO WARS

On January 9th, 1853, the Russian Tsar Nicholas met the English Ambassador, Sir Hamilton Seymour, at a ball, and began to discuss the Turkish question. "We have on our hands," he said, "a sick man, a very sick man; it would be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made." To this veiled offer of partition of Turkey the English Ambassador replied: "It is the duty of the strong and generous man to help the sick and weak." In the following year England went to war in defence of Ottoman integrity.

I

By the end of 1918 it seemed that the sick man of Europe was at last about to die. The Empire of the Tsars, it is true, had failed to survive the Ottoman Sultanate, and Russia, torn by revolution and civil war, was for the moment out of the running. But England and France, the traditional upholders of Ottoman integrity, were now enemies of Turkey, and were joined by Italy, a Mediterranean Power with a growing appetite for colonial expansion. In the months immediately following the armistice of Mudros, things looked black indeed for the decaying Empire. Allied military and naval forces controlled Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. French soldiers were in Istanbul, Italians in Pera, French negroes and Senegalese in

Galata, and British warships in the Golden Horn. The port, forts, defences, police, gendarmerie, and tramways were all under strict Allied control. Farther east, the Arab provinces of the Empire—Syria, Palestine, Iraq—were under British and French military occupation, and had been promised independence under Allied mandates. Even Anatolia itself was threatened. French forces advanced from Syria into the districts of Cilicia and Adana. The Italians landed at Antalya on April 29th, 1919, and occupied a large area, while British forces occupied the Dardanelles, Samsun, Ayntap, and many other strategic points, as well as the whole length of the Anatolian railway.

The further outlook, too, left little room for hope. The Turkish nation, defeated and discouraged, seemed to be at the lowest ebb of its fortunes and morale. Twelve years of war had left the country disorganized, impoverished, depopulated, and demoralized. The Young Turk movement, that in 1908 had seemed to bring new hope to Turkey, was finished. Its leaders, broken and discredited, had fled. In Constantinople, under Allied control, a new government was formed, reactionary and anti-nationalist in character, subservient to the will of the occupying forces. The Sultan himself was no more than an Allied puppet. The victorious Powers were far too busy in the West to find time to attend to the affairs of Turkey, and no serious attempt was made to settle the Turkish question until the San Remo conference of April 1920. During the two years of delay, when a prostrate Turkey awaited the decision of the conquerors, speculation, bargaining, and canvassing went on. Quarrels broke out between the Allies over the implementing of the various secret war-time treaties providing for the partition of Turkey, and at times the Allied representatives were in open opposition over questions of commercial and political privilege. In this situation of ignominy the Turks seemed to have lost the very will to independent existence. In Constantinople a puppet government crushed what few stirrings of revolt there were, and political

discussion seemed to centre around the form which Turkish subjection was to take. Some demanded a British mandate for Turkey, others an American mandate. Kurdish, Armenian, and other elements began to seek local autonomy under Allied protection, and an attempt was actually made to set up a separate republic in Eastern Anatolia.

Meanwhile, the wranglings of the victor Powers led to an event which had far-reaching consequences in the history of modern Turkey. The Greeks, led by their talented and ambitious Premier, M. Venizelos, dreamed of restoring the ancient glories of Hellenism and creating a greater Greek kingdom, including Asia Minor. The jealousy with which the Great Powers regarded each other's progress in Anatolia provided a favourable situation, and early in 1919 Venizelos succeeded in persuading Mr. Lloyd George to agree to a Greek occupation of Smyrna and the surrounding country. The pretext for the occupation of Smyrna was the general disorder in the district and the consequent danger to Greeks and other minority elements. The real reason was to forestall an Italian occupation, and, to a lesser degree, to gratify the ambitions of Greek Imperialists. As Mr. Lloyd George says in his memoirs: "There was a race between the Italians and the Greeks as to which of them should be the first to land a garrison in Smyrna. Prompt action taken by Wilson, Clemenceau, and myself enabled Venizelos to get a Greek force into the town whilst the Italians were hesitating."

On May 15th, 1919, a Greek army was landed at Smyrna, under cover of British, French, and American warships, and proceeded to a systematic occupation of the town and surrounding country. A terrible massacre of Turks followed, and a reign of terror in the worst local tradition.

The events of subsequent years have shown that, in encouraging and arming the Greek expedition, Lloyd George committed one of the few major errors of his career. The legal inadequacy of the grounds on which the occupation was ordered were soon exposed, and on

October 12th, 1919, the Inter-Allied Commission in Constantinople declared that "this occupation was not at all justifiable, and violated the terms of the Armistice between the Powers and Turkey." The expedition gave rise to a long and bloody war, embittered by massacre and recrimination, and caused a serious worsening in Anglo-Turkish relations for many years.

The consequences for Turkey were momentous. As long as the attack of the victors had been levelled in the main against the non-Turkish subject provinces of the Empire, as long as political servitude had been imposed only on the Ottoman superstructure of the Turkish nation, little or no reaction was provoked. But now the attack was directed against the very heart of Turkey. Unlike the Allies, the Greeks showed that they intended to stay, and regarded themselves as a permanent army of occupation, preparing the incorporation of the country into the Greek kingdom. The Turkish reaction was tremendous and instantaneous. The Nationalist movement, hitherto a vague and abstract affair of a few intellectuals, became a powerful expression of the burning resentment of the Turks at the insults that were being offered to their nationhood. The Turks were ready to rise against the invader—only the leader was awaited.

. . . . .

On May 19th, 1919, four days after the Greek landing, Mustafa Kemal Pasha landed at the Black Sea port of Samsun, in Northern Anatolia.

. . . . .

Mustafa Kemal was born in Salonica, then a Turkish city, in 1880. After passing through both the old style religious and new style secondary schools, he decided to take up an army career, and spent six years, first as a junior cadet in Monastir, and then at the Staff College in Istanbul. He was gazetted a captain in 1904. His military promotion after that was rapid. Already as a student he took an active interest in nationalist politics. While yet in Salonica he learnt French, and studied the forbidden works of French revolutionary writers. As

a cadet he was connected with nationalist secret societies, and acquired a reputation as an orator and pamphleteer, preaching the liberation of Turkey from the despotism of the Sultan and the economic domination of the foreigner. Before long, his talents and energies made him a leader among the young rebels, and, as the intricate espionage system of the Sultan easily outwitted their youthful enthusiasm, he soon found himself in prison on political charges. On being released, he was posted to a regiment in Damascus—virtually an exile. It was there that he had his first taste of active service. Undaunted by threats and imprisonment, he continued to organize national revolutionary cells in Damascus, and, feeling that little could be achieved in so out-of-the-way a place, determined to return to the Balkans. After an unsuccessful attempt to smuggle himself back, he managed to arrange a transfer, and was posted to the 3rd Army Staff in Salonica. There he got in touch with the Young Turk movement, the Committee of Union and Progress, and worked with them for a while, though not without some uneasiness. His relations with the Young Turk leaders were never cordial, and the successful revolution of 1908 did not bring him greatly to the fore. Shortly after this, Mustafa Kemal abandoned politics for a while, and returned with zest to a military career. The Italo-Turkish War of 1911 found him at Derna, in Libya, in command of a Turkish force, and the Balkan war brought him back to a Thracian campaign During the uneasy peace that followed, he was Turkish military attaché in Sofia, where he stayed until February 1915, when he was recalled at his own request to join the Turkish forces operating against the Allies. Mustafa Kemal was opposed to the Turkish entry into the war, which he regarded as precipitate and unwise. He was never confident of German victory. Even when the Germans were advancing on Paris, he expressed his doubts, and made many severe criticisms during his visit to Germany. However, as a soldier, he felt impelled to apply for transfer to active service, and after some delay due to intrigues among his enemies, he was recalled

and posted. He was sent to Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission, who appointed him to the command of the Turkish forces in Southern Gallipoli. Always a skilful soldier, he distinguished himself in the Gallipoli campaign, and after its successful outcome, returned to Istanbul. Despite, or perhaps because of his great military reputation as saviour of the Dardanelles, he soon succeeded, by his constant complaints and his innumerable brushes with the German advisers whom he disliked, in making himself unpopular with the ruling clique, and before long he was posted to Eastern Anatolia, many hundreds of miles from the capital. After a brief campaign in the Caucasus, the Russian collapse rendered his presence on that front unnecessary, and he was transferred to Syria, which, in view of the new British attack through Palestine, was now the most dangerous front. Relations between him and his German collaborators grew so bad, however, that his position there became untenable, and he returned once more to Istanbul. Two visits to Europe followed—one as a member of a Turkish military mission to Germany, where he was confirmed in his conviction of German defeat, the second to Austria for medical treatment. In July 1918, still weak from illness, he returned to Istanbul, and in August he assumed a command on the Syrian front. It was while he was carrying on the desperate struggle against the advancing British that he heard of the signature of the Armistice of Mudros. A month later he was back in the occupied capital.

. . . . .

From the first moment of his arrival in Istanbul the returning general was imbued with a single idea —to save the Turkish homelands from foreign invasion and domination, and, disregarding the vast non-Turkish provinces that had for long encumbered and hampered the Turkish nation, to create a purely Turkish, independent and progressive State out of what remained. To do this it was necessary to accomplish a great deal. The old political parties were dead or discredited, and the capital was under foreign occupation. The task

Mustafa Kemal set himself was to create a new political party vowed to the liberation of Turkey and, in the inaccessible inland of Anatolia, to forge an army and movement that would be strong enough to drive out the invader, and establish Turkish liberty. That the Turkish people, in this moment of defeat and humiliation, was able to accomplish all this and more, is one of the most astonishing features of recent history.

Despite his prestige as the sole remaining victorious general in Turkey, he received a poor reception in Istanbul. The Sultan Vahdettin and his Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, were in the hands of the British, and were firmly resolved to prevent any popular movement of revolt, which, they felt, might threaten the throne and the existing order as much as it threatened the invader. And so they continued the disarming of the Turkish forces, ordered the Turkish troops in Smyrna to offer no resistance to the Greeks, and suppressed any tendency to rebel. As Kemal himself said later, with characteristic vigour: "Those who had dragged the country and the nation into the Great War had fled with the sole care of saving their skins. He who occupied the position of Sultan and Caliph was a degenerate who, by infamous means, sought only to save his own person and throne. The Cabinet, presided over by Damad Ferid Pasha, was composed of men both incapable and cowardly, utterly without dignity, blindly subjected to the will of the Sultan, and seeking only to save their own persons. These men were ready to agree to any situation."[1]

Realizing the hopeless condition of the capital, Mustafa Kemal decided to go to Anatolia, where some small signs of resistance were already noticeable. A fortunate chance enabled him to get an appointment as Inspector-General of the 3rd Army in Anatolia. On May 19th he arrived at Samsun to take up his command, and began immediately the double task of organizing a movement and raising an army.

[1] Mustafa Kemal, speaking in 1927 to the Congress of the Turkish People's Party.

Meanwhile, in the West the victor Powers were at last completing their arrangements for the partition of Turkey. After a series of conferences in London and San Remo, a treaty was drawn up, and was signed by the Allied representative and by those of the Sultan's government at Sèvres on August 10th, 1920.

The Treaty of Sèvres was very harsh. The Arab provinces were to be placed under British or French mandate, with a view to ultimate independence. In Anatolia itself, Armenian and Kurdish States were to be set up in the east, the whole southern half of the country was to be ceded to Italy and France, and a puppet Turkish Sultanate was to be confined to the interior. The Straits area was to be demilitarized and placed under inter-Allied control and administration, with a Turkish Constantinople surrounded on all sides by Allied forces. The remainder of European Turkey was to be ceded to Greece. Finally, the Smyrna area was to be under "Ottoman sovereignty and Greek administration."

The effect of the Treaty of Sèvres was to leave Turkey helpless and mutilated, a shadow State, living on the sufferance of the Powers who were annexing her richest provinces. It was far more severe than that imposed on a defeated Germany, and was received with a national day of mourning in Turkey. It was, however, never implemented.

While the Allies were imposing their terms on the docile government of the Sultan, a new Turkish State was being built up in Anatolia—one that rejected outright the Treaty and the principles on which it was based, and condemned as traitors those Turks who had accepted it. Mustafa Kemal and his emissaries toured the interior, organizing the cadres of a national army, and preparing the ground for a war of liberation. On July 23rd, 1919, the first Nationalist Congress was held at Erzerum, far away in Eastern Turkey, and a national programme was drawn up in secret. A second Congress, at Sivas, was held on September 4th of the same year, and was attended by delegates from all over the country. An executive committee, presided over by Mustafa Kemal,

was elected, and a declaration of policy was published. The committee chose Ankara, then a backward and insanitary Asiatic town, as its headquarters. Frequent meetings were held in Ankara, which now became the virtual capital of the Nationalist movement, and the centre from which military operations were directed. It was there that the famous *"Milli Misak"* or National Pact was drawn up—the Turkish declaration of Independence, demanding the integrity and independence of the Turkish parts of the old Empire. Meanwhile, a new government, more favourable to the Nationalist cause, had replaced that of Damad Ferid Pasha, and on January 28th, 1920, the National Pact was voted by the legal Parliament in Istanbul. The Nationalist cause, now constitutionally supported in the capital, seemed to be in a strong position. The Allies, however, reacted vigorously. On March 16th, British forces entered the Turkish city of Istanbul, and arrested and deported many of the Nationalist leaders who had gone there. The Sultan, exploiting the opportunity, recalled Damad Ferid Pasha, and began a vigorous campaign against the Nationalists, summoning the people of Turkey to resist them, and arming irregular forces. At the request of the Sultan, a solemn edict was issued by the Muslim clergy of Constantinople, branding the Nationalists as heretics and enemies of religion.

The Nationalists, outlawed both by the Allies and by the Sultan's government, did not for a moment despair. On March 19th, 1920, Mustafa Kemal ordered general elections, and on April 23rd a National Assembly of 350 deputies met in Ankara, and voted the National Pact. In the days following, a provisional constitution was promulgated and a government set up, with Mustafa Kemal himself as President. The Sultan and his government were declared deposed.

. . . . .

The task that remained was military—the liberation by force of the national soil. It was one of great difficulty, and to most observers infinitely beyond the resources of the isolated and ill-equipped nationalist

forces. The enemy had to be fought on several fronts—the French in the south, the separatists in the east, the Greeks and Allies in the west—and all this in the face of determined opposition from the Sultan and his followers. Some factors, it must be pointed out, were favourable to the Kemalists, the friendly attitude of the new rulers of Russia being the chief of them. The Western Powers, too, were exhausted by many years of war, and unwilling or unable to undertake protracted military operations on a large scale. These do not, however, lessen the astonishing character of the Turkish achievement.

After suppressing the separatists and irregulars who harassed his rear, and inflicting a severe defeat on the French in the south, Mustafa Kemal turned to the Greeks. The Greco-Turkish War falls into three stages, covering roughly the campaigns of the years 1920, 1921, and 1922. In the first campaign, the Turks, hopelessly outmatched in numbers and materials, were badly defeated, and Greek forces advanced in both Asia and Europe. The Turkish resistance was, however, sufficiently strong to impress the Allies, who, for the first time, gave a certain official recognition to the Nationalist Government, and formally proclaimed their neutrality in the Greco-Turkish War. The second Greek campaign, in 1921, opened well for the invaders, who made several important gains. The Turks rallied, and in April a Turkish force under Colonel Ismet drove back the Greeks near Inönü. It was from this battle that Ismet, the collaborator and successor of Kemal took his name. A new Greek advance began in July, and continued until the Greeks met the Turks on the Sakarya River. Here, on August 24th, a great battle took place, and the Turkish forces, under the personal command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, inflicted a decisive defeat on the invaders, who withdrew to a line farther west. The victorious general was greeted by the Turkish National Assembly with the title of 'Gazi'—conqueror.

The effects of the victory of Sakarya were considerable. For one thing, the Turkish nationalists were now recognized as a powerful factor, the real government of

Turkey. The French, who had never been enthusiastic about Britain's policy of supporting and encouraging the Greeks, now decided to withdraw from the south altogether, and made an agreement with the Turks. A French delegate was sent to Ankara, and on October 20th a Franco-Turkish treaty was signed, drawing up a new Turco-Syrian frontier, far more favourable to Turkey than that laid down by the Treaty of Sèvres, and providing for the French evacuation of Cilicia. The French withdrawal considerably strengthened the Turkish military position in Anatolia, and, moreover, large quantities of French arms now began to find their way to the Turkish forces. The Italians, too, found it prudent to withdraw from their zone, stipulating only the retention by them of the Dodecanese islands. Already in January of 1921 an agreement had been signed between Turkey and the Soviets, fixing the frontier between the two States, and establishing friendly relations which have lasted without a break into present times.

A period of waiting followed, during which both sides reorganized and strengthened their forces, unsuccessful negotiations were attempted, and a change of government in Greece adversely affected the morale of the Greek armies. In August 1922 the third and final phase of the war began. The Turkish Army, by now irresistible, drove back the Greeks in headlong retreat, and at last, on September 9th, reoccupied Smyrna, thus completing the reconquest of Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal now prepared to cross over to European Turkey, and drive the Greeks out of Thrace. To do so he had to cross the Dardanelles, which was still occupied by an inter-Allied force. The French and Italian contingents withdrew, but for a while an Anglo-Turkish clash seemed imminent. In the end, however, the British gave way to Kemal's demands, and on October 11th an armistice was signed at Mudanya. By it, the Allied Governments agreed to a restoration of Turkish sovereignty in Eastern Thrace, and merely delayed full occupation pending the signature of a peace treaty. The Greeks acceded to the armistice on October 14th. On November 4th the

Sultan's Cabinet resigned, and on the 17th the Sultan himself left Turkey, an exile. The country had henceforth only one government, and Istanbul, the ancient seat of empire, was a provincial city, ruled by a governor appointed by Ankara.

The peace conference opened at Lausanne on November 20th, 1922. Many months of diplomatic wrangling followed, while the Turkish demands were firmly and unswervingly adhered to by the Turkish delegate, Ismet Pasha. Finally, on July 24th, 1923, the treaty was signed The chief significance of the treaty was the re-establishment of complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty in almost all the territory included in the modern Turkish Republic, and the abolition of the last vestiges of foreign economic and political control. The only reservation was for the demilitarization of the Straits, which were not to be fortified without the consent of the Powers. This consent was given at the Montreux Conference in June 1936. Provision was also made for an exchange of population between Greece and Turkey, as a final settlement of the minority problems of both countries, and for the distribution of the Ottoman national debt among the succession States. Certain other questions were left over for the decision of the League of Nations.

Thus Turkey, alone among the defeated Powers of the Great War of 1914–1918, succeeded in rising from among its own ruins, and, rejecting the dictated peace imposed upon it by the victors, secured the acceptance of its own terms. For the Treaty of Lausanne is substantially an international recognition of the demands formulated in the Turkish National Pact.

Certain questions, such as that of the status of Mosul, on the Turco-Iraqi frontier, and Alexandretta, on the Turco-Syrian frontier, remained unsettled. To these we shall revert hereafter.

. . . . .

The Treaty of Lausanne marks a decisive stage in the history of the Eastern Question. The period of Turkish weakness and decline is over—the one-time sick man is in the bloom of health. From now on a new Turkey,

based on ethnically Turkish territory, renascent, victorious, and self-confident, faces the world, firmly established on the national soil in both Europe and Asia. The Turkish people was about to enter on a new and glorious period of its history.

II

The military struggle against the West was won. There remained the spiritual struggle against the Orient—the war of reformist, modernist Turkey against the old theocracy that had strangled the intellectual life of the country for so long. Unlike so many national military heroes, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had a conception of things extending far beyond the immediate military issue. He realized from the start that it was useless to achieve the political liberation of Turkey from foreign occupation if the old factors of decay that had brought her so low were to be allowed to remain in operation. Though the Sultan was deposed, the old order was still intact. The religious hierarchy still exercised an undue influence, training the Turkish mind in habits of fatalism and subservience, preparing the ground for a new reactionary and autocratic order. Old, deeply-rooted prejudices prevented the development of a new cultural spirit; old social observances, perhaps the most deadly among them being the segregation and subjection of women, kept the Turkish people in a stagnant backwash of history, and prevented any real social progress. A society which deliberately excludes half its adult population from any share in communal life cannot hope to keep pace with the modern world. The prejudice which rejected as irreligious and impious any invention coming from the infidel West crippled the technical development of the country, and left her backward and weak among powerful and advancing neighbours. The economic situation, too, was disastrous. The Turkish people, long accustomed to be either the soldiers and administrators of an Empire, or else peasants, had no commercial middle class, and no accumulation of capital in the country. The long economic control of Europe,

and the utter inefficiency of the Imperial Government, left the economy of the country weakened and disorganized. The years of war from 1911 to 1922 completed the work of destruction. The departure of the non-Turkish middle classes after the Treaty of Lausanne, hitherto the chief agents of commercial circulation, left a gaping void.

The Nationalists thus found themselves in control of a ruined and devastated country, with a primitive agriculture and little or no industry or capital. With a population under the influence of a reactionary and obscurantist clergy, and completely without training for the requirements of modern economic life, the prospects of effectively maintaining the independence of Turkey seemed poor, indeed. The victory of Mustafa Kemal in what may be called the second war of liberation—from the internal enemy—is even more remarkable than the first.

The campaign of social reform by Kemal and his followers required, in the first place, certain political changes. After the deposition and exile of Sultan Vahdettin in November 1922, a successor, Abdul-Majid, was appointed by the National Assembly in Ankara. The new sovereign was recognized as Caliph—religious head of the Islamic religion, but was denied the title of Sultan or secular monarch. The Sultanate was thus abolished. After many months, a second step was taken and on October 13th, 1923, Ankara was formally proclaimed capital of the Turkish State. Shortly after, on October 29th, Turkey was declared a Republic, with the Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha as President.

Thus, within less than a year, three mortal blows were given to the old system. The Sultanate, for centuries the central institution of theocratic order and the rallying point of the forces of reaction and autocracy, was done away with, and a new political system, borrowed from Europe, and expressive of European ideas of liberty and progress, was adopted in its place. It may be said without exaggeration that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was as momentous an event in Turkish

history as was that of the first French Republic in the history of France. The change of capital was hardly less important. Constantinople was in Turkish minds inextricably connected with the old regime and its traditions and prejudices. Istanbul, the Turkish half of the city, with its mosques and minarets and its Imperial palace, seat of the Sultanate and of the chief religious dignitaries; Pera, the Levantine suburb, with its cosmopolitan community of concessionaires and other survivors from the days of European economic exploitation—these were far too much associated with the forces of the past to provide a centre for a new Turkey. And so a new capital was built, symbolizing the break with all that had gone before. The site of the new capital was well chosen. The hill city of Ankara, far inside Anatolia, is almost inaccessible, and is equipped with magnificent natural and artificial fortifications. Difficult of access to an enemy, it provides an excellent pivot of defence, and enjoys relatively good rail and telegraph communications with Istanbul and Smyrna—better, at any rate, than those of any other inland city. Near the old town a new city grew up which, with its wide streets and spacious avenues, its fine new buildings and its university, offers a living monument to the vitality of the Turkish people and the strength of their national resurgence.

The proclamation of the Turkish Republic was received with some doubts in Europe. The Young Turks too had tried liberal reforms, and had failed dismally. Could an Oriental despotism be converted into a European republic overnight? Many regarded the republic as a mere façade. Others thought that, at best, it would last as long as Mustafa Kemal himself. Events have proved that the pessimists were wrong. During its seventeen years of life the Republic has achieved wonders of reform and revival, and, perhaps the most serious test of all, has succeeded in surviving the death of its creator and leader for many years.

. . . . .

The next step in the great Turkish revolution came in March 1924, when the first direct attack was made on

the theocracy. In a series of epoch-making edicts, the National Assembly abolished the Caliphate and expelled the Caliph, thus finally removing the last faint vestiges of an ancient office, and bringing the role of the Ottoman dynasty in Turkish history to an end. Muslim and other religious schools were closed down, and their endowments diverted to other purposes. Religious courts were similarly treated, and many ecclesiastical institutions abolished or rigorously curtailed. These principles were embodied in the new Turkish Constitution, promulgated on April 20th, 1924. This provides for an elected Parliament, called the Great National Assembly, which is the repository of individual sovereign power. The Assembly exercises legislative power directly, and executive power "through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by him. The Assembly controls the acts of the Government, and may at any time withdraw power from it."[1] The civil character of the Government is assured by a clause excluding army officers from the Assembly.

Already, in 1923, Mustafa Kemal decided to form a political party which would embody the principles of the Nationalist Revolution, and would be the chief instrument of change. This party, called the Republican People's Party, was established on September 9th, 1923, and came to play a part of decisive importance in Turkish public life.

The years following the proclamation of the Republic saw the enaction of a whole series of reforms, intended to transform Turkey from an Oriental into a European State. In 1925 the old religious tithes were abolished, and a new system of taxation was imposed. Dervish monasteries and religious fraternities were dissolved, and their property confiscated. The European calendar and day were adopted in place of the Islamic. In the same year the fez, the traditional headdress that resembled an inverted flower-pot was abolished, and the European hat adopted in its place. This reform, though it may seem to be purely external in character to Euro-

[1] Article 7.

pean observers, was in reality of considerable importance. In Oriental countries dress, and particularly headdress, is traditionally connected with one or other social or religious group, and great stress is laid on this question. In the words of the Turkish writer, Tekin Alp :

> The Fez had acquired a symbolic value. It was a mark distinguishing from the infidels the followers of the Prophet, those who seek for happiness only in the Paradise of Muhammed. To wear the hat is to mix oneself in the crowd of unbelievers.

By introducing the hat, Mustafa Kemal wished to signify the entry of the Turks into the comity of European peoples. Again to quote Tekin Alp :

> The real purpose was not to change the headgear but the head.

The law was a part of the general attack on theocratic institutions. Another aspect of the same struggle is to be seen in the emancipation of women. For centuries the Turkish woman had been veiled and secluded, and had languished in the indolence and ignorance of the Harem. A certain measure of emancipation had already been achieved under the Young Turks. Kemal carried the process much further. In a lecture given at Smyrna in 1923, he said :

> When, in a society composed of members of two sexes, the members of one sex only are modernized, more than half that society remains backward. A nation which desires to progress and civilize itself must never lose sight of this very important point. Our people is determined to become strong and civilized. To achieve that, we must assure at all costs the emancipation of the woman. . . . New Turkey has need of men with a new mentality. It is our mothers of the future who can give them to us.

And so the veil followed the fez to oblivion, Turkish girls entered the schools and universities with their male contemporaries, and took their part in commerce, the professions, and in public life.

In 1926 a number of important legal reforms were

accomplished. The old Ottoman law was abolished, and civil, commercial and penal codes adopted from Europe. This juridical reform marked a vast social change in Turkish life, and had as one consequence the prohibition of polygamy and the end of the legal subjection of women. Other laws followed regulating such questions as hours and conditions of labour and the tenure of land. In all these the purpose was to bring Turkey into line with the European countries and to adapt her social structure accordingly.

In 1928 two very important changes took place. The process of secularisation had already gone far enough for it to be possible to accomplish a step which Mustafa Kemal had long intended. On April 5th of that year the Great National Assembly recognized the separation of religion and the State by erasing from the Constitution the clause "The religion of the Turkish State is Islam," and by adapting other clauses accordingly. Henceforth Turkey is a lay Republic, without any official religion.

In the same year, in gradual stages, the President introduced the Latin alphabet for writing Turkish in place of the Arabic one. The Turkish peoples had adopted the Arabic alphabet from the Arabs at the same time as they adopted Islam, and for about a thousand years Turkish had been written in the Arabic script. The letters, however, which had been created for Arabic sounds were wholly unsuitable for the expression of Turkish sounds, and the old writing was always an uneasy misfit. Moreover, the retention of the Arabic script helped greatly to keep Turkey apart from the western nations, and thus indirectly strengthened the hand of the theocracy. The first step was to teach the new alphabet, and so the President himself, the Prime Minister Ismet Pasha, and a host of others toured every town and village of the country in the rôle of schoolmasters. For a few months an entire nation went back to school to learn the new Turkish script, which opened up to them the closed book of the west. Besides being more occidental, the new script was more practical than the old. Easier to read and cheaper to print, it proved

a great aid to education, and it is estimated that some two million people who had hitherto been totally illiterate learned to read and write the new script. After a brief period of preparation, newspapers and books began to appear in the new script, and finally the Assembly voted the complete suppression of the old. The change of alphabet was accompanied by a campaign to free the language from the many Persian and Arabic borrowings that encumbered it. After a period of linguistic change, during which pedantic and unnecessary foreign words were ejected, Turkish has now more or less stabilised itself.

Of the many other reforms of the Turkish Government, one other may be noticed, as possessing some sociological interest. The absence of any social or legal obligation outside religion in old Turkey had caused the disappearance of surnames. The Turk was known by his own name and that of his father—thus Ali Riza—Ali son of Riza. Sometimes, where several persons of the same name were to be found, another distinguishing name might be added, referring to the bearer's occupation or birthplace. This was, however, a personal and not a family name. In 1935 a law was passed ordering the adoption of surnames by all Turks. Mustafa Kemal and Ismet led the way—the former with the name Atatürk, Father-Turk, the latter with Inönü, commemorating the victory won by him in the war of liberation. We shall henceforth refer to them by these names.

Besides all these sweeping major reforms, a great deal has been done by way of steady, day-to-day development. Education has been secularised and greatly extended. New schools have been built in many places, and several institutions of higher education. The University of Istanbul has been expanded and another set up in Ankara. The school and university population has increased enormously, and illiteracy has been greatly reduced. The circulation of newspapers has been doubled and trebled since the adoption of the Latin script. In addition to the regular schools, the "People's

Houses" (*Halk Evleri*), set up by the People's Party in the years following 1932 have performed a cultural service of inestimable value. These centres are to be found in every large town and in many small towns and villages, and in 1938 numbered 209. Each People's House has a library, and serves as a centre for cultural work in the vicinity. Adult education, physical culture, amateur dramatics and social assistance are among their chief activities. These institutions thus perform an important task in the social, sanitary and intellectual development of the rural population. Health services generally have been greatly extended and improved, and the problem of peasant welfare has been seriously taken in hand. Penal and judicial reforms have kept pace with social change.

Of the economic activities of the Kemalist Government we shall speak in our next chapter. Suffice it to say here that every aspect of economic life—agriculture, industry, commerce, banking and communications, etc. —has received the careful attention of the Government, and has been greatly developed—always with the purpose of securing at once the welfare of the Turkish people and the economic independence of the Turkish State.

. . . . . .

The internal political history of the Turkish Republic since its establishment is on the whole uneventful. The sweeping reforms of the earlier years of necessity aroused some opposition in reactionary circles and even among more moderate reformers who disliked the rapid rate of change. The opposition, however, though often articulate, never assumed serious dimensions, and did not succeed in deflecting the course of reform. It should be noted that none of the violence usual in dictator states was used against the Turkish opposition. The only serious incidents were the Kurdish revolts of 1925 and 1930. The Kurds, a semi-nomadic minority people living in southern and eastern Anatolia, revolted in the name of the Sultan, and proclaimed the end of the Republic and the restoration of the old regime. Despite the support they received from reactionary circles in

Istanbul and elsewhere, the rebels were suppressed on both occasions after a brief campaign, and more vigorous measures were, as we have already seen, adopted against the theocrats.

While Mustafa Kemal Atatürk remained President for the rest of his lifetime, some changes of Prime Minister took place. In 1924 the Opposition "Progress" Party received a majority, and its leader Fethi Okyar, later ambassador in Paris and London and now Minister of Justice in Ankara, became Prime Minister. The Kurdish revolt, however, caused the collapse of his ministry, and Ismet Inönü, the right-hand man of Atatürk, returned to power for many years. In 1937 he was replaced as Prime Minister by Celal Bayar, with no apparent change of policy.

On November 11th, 1938, after a long illness, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died. The loss to his country was enormous, and was grieved throughout the length and breadth of Turkey. The firm hand that for so many years had guided the Turkish nation from servitude to freedom and from ignorance to progress was gone, and to many it must have seemed that Turkey stood in a situation of extreme danger. It says much for the way in which Atatürk performed his task that the Republic was able to survive his death and carry on with flying colours. Ismet Inönü, his companion in arms and collaborator, was elected as his successor almost without opposition. Some slight changes in domestic policy followed, but in the main the Republic continued along the lines laid down by the Gazi. Some cabinet changes took place. B. Celal Bayar[1] was replaced as Prime Minister by Dr. Refik Saydam. Dr. Rüshtü Aras, for many years foreign minister, was now sent to London as ambassador—an obvious sign of the importance which the Turkish Government by now attached to Anglo-Turkish relations. B. Fethi Okyar was recalled and later appointed to the Ministry of Justice, and B. Shükrü Sarajoğlu assumed the portfolio of foreign affairs. A number of other changes were effected. Since

[1] B. stands for Bay, the Turkish equivalent of Mr.

then the Turkish Government has remained substantially unaltered.

It remains for us to glance briefly at the political and social principles that underlie the Turkish Republic—in short, at what has come to be known as Kemalism. These principles are summed up in six points, formulated in the programme of the People's Party, and later incorporated in the Constitution, Article 2, of which now begins: "The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, *étatiste*, lay, and revolutionary."

Turkish nationalism is the mainspring of the movement and its chief source of energy. This nationalism, if we may judge it by the statements of authoritative Turkish writers, is neither aggressive nor imperialistic.

> Our ambition is to become a peaceful member of the family of civilized humanity, an element of progress in the world and above all in the Orient.
>
> Our nationalism is intellectual in character and seeks to give back to the Turkish people the consciousness of its value and of its capacities, so long and so unjustly misrepresented.
>
> Mysticism has not the slightest hold on the Kemalist movement. It has never needed such stimulants. . . . Kemalist nationalism has nothing artificial or supernatural in it, and represents only the growth of the instinct of self-preservation.

Basically, then, Turkish nationalism is a reaction in the first place against the old regime, in which the Turkish national conscience was submerged in an interracial religious empire, with religion as its emblem of citizenship, and in which the Turks alone among many nations had no sense of national identity. It represents the determination to make nationality, not religion, the binding link in the State. It is a reaction in the second place against foreign political control, and expresses the proud self-reliance of a people that has recently won its freedom by force of arms against powerful enemies.

To many it must seem that the populist or democratic

principles expressed in the Turkish Constitution and in Turkish political literature are largely theoretical. In many respects, it is true, Turkey seems a dictatorship. The one party state, the considerable powers exercised by the President, Atatürk or Inönü, the absence of an effective opposition, certainly do not constitute Parliamentary democracy as we know it. But there are many vital differences between Turkey and the Dictatorships. The sovereignty of the people, and of their representatives in the Great National Assembly, is firmly laid down and adhered to, and the principle of personal sovereignty has been execrated again and again as one of the chief defects of the old regime. The Assembly is no Reichstag but plays an important part. It can be dissolved only by its own decision, and meets at fixed dates without waiting for a summons. Full liberty of opposition, in a country emerging from centuries of autocratic rule and traversing a critical period of reform, could lead only to disorder. The experiment of allowing a parliamentary opposition was tried in 1924, without success. In 1935, after a lapse of years, a second attempt was made, and a small number of non-party deputies elected. While all political activity outside the Kemalist programme is forbidden, a remarkable degree of freedom of thought and expression remains. Thus, although the Communist Party is illegal, communist theoretical literature, in Turkish, is exposed for sale in the bookshops, and a Communist poet, Nazim Hikmet, enjoys great popularity. Opponents of the Government are not subjected to torture and imprisonment in concentration camps, but are left at liberty, or at worst are exiled. Most important of all, the tendency is to increase the degree of political liberty. The control of the Press, once very strict, has been relaxed to some extent, and the Turkish Press to-day reveals a range and variety of opinions on various topics that are quite inconceivable in Berlin or Rome. Personal liberty is assured in Turkey, and most of the exiles of earlier years are returning and settling down unmolested. Turkish leaders have again and again proclaimed their abhorrence of social

and religious persecution, and have asserted the complete equality of all citizens before the law.

> Unlike certain other States, Kemalist Turkey knows no minority problems. All its citizens enjoy equal rights. Just as Kemalism is not an article for export, Turkey does not accept the systems in force in other countries.

This statement, made on January 20th in 1938, by the then Prime Minister, B. Celal Bayar, indicates clearly the Turkish rejection of Nazism and allied doctrines. A recent statement by Dr. Refik Saydam, the present Turkish Prime Minister, shows even more clearly the trend of Turkish political developments.[1]

> Our regime is based on constitutional principles. We respect the liberties of all. . . . A system which aims to rule without control is an easy one, but such a system is not acceptable to us. Our goal is not to govern without control, but to ensure prosperity and progress through the safest methods. The safest way, in our opinion, is the one which leads to a responsible democratic regime.

It has been said that Atatürk was a dictator in order that there might never again be a dictator in Turkey—that is to say, that the Turkish Government, while exercising semi-dictatorial powers, deliberately diminished those powers and trained the Turkish people to receive the regime of liberty for which they were as yet quite unprepared.

Turkey is lay, in that she rejects the theocratic past which has submerged the national conscience and kept her backward and undeveloped. The new regime thus assures an important measure both of intellectual freedom and social equality that had hitherto been unknown. *Etatisme* the control of economic life by the State, was a necessary precaution, in view of the impoverished and disorganized state of the country after the last war, to forestall the establishment of European economic and financial control.

The last adjective—revolutionary (*Inkilâpci*) denotes the habit of mind and tempo of change that were neces-

[1] January 18th, 1940, quoted by Halidé Edib in "Foreign Affairs," New York, April 1940.

sary to create the new Turkey, and for the time being, at least, are still necessary to maintain it. For let us not deceive ourselves. The Turkish revolution is by no means complete and there is still much to be done. In the pages that have gone before we have traced the growth of an elaborate structure of political and legal reform. It is impossible for social change to have kept pace. The deeply ingrained social habits that a nation has acquired during centuries cannot be altered by the action of a legislature, however revolutionary, or by the stroke of a pen. Among the more educated classes and in the larger towns, it is true, the social change has already gone far. In the villages the work is still in many respects beginning, and many years of hard effort lie ahead before the revolution that is transforming Turkey into a European State of the Western type is completed. The work will be done not so much by enactment as by day-to-day effort in the villages and in the countryside by such institutions as the People's Houses, the elementary schools, and the local sanitary services, as well as by the advancing course of industrialisation. For the completion of this great task Turkey requires peace, and it is in the need for external peace in order to accomplish internal change that we may find the key to many aspects of Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF TURKEY

"In order to endow the State with a structure capable of making up for centuries of indifference, of restoring what was wrongfully destroyed—that is, one fit to stand the severe tests of modern times, it was necessary first to remove the causes of economic weakness."

Ismet Inönü.

"Agriculture is the foundation of the national economy. We therefore stress the importance of agricultural recovery. A programme of well-planned and practical undertakings extended to the remotest villages will facilitate the attainment of this end. . . .

"Industrialisation is one of the most prominent of our national objectives. We shall establish and run all kinds of industries, large and small, whenever the economic elements necessary for their existence are available in the country. This is a necessity for the defence of our country, which stands foremost among our preoccupations, and then for the increase in value of our products and the realization, in the shortest possible period, of our ideal: a progressive and prosperous Turkey."

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
Speech to the Great National Assembly
Nov. 1st, 1937.

TURKEY has an area slightly smaller than that of France, and a population of nearly 17 millions. In these days of minority problems and fifth column activity it is worth while to note that this population is almost solidly Turkish, the only minority of any importance being the Kurds in S.E. Anatolia. The country forms a compact block of territory stretching from the Aegean in the west to the Caucasus in the East, and from the Black Sea in the north to the Arab States in the south.

Turkey is by nature a rich country. The climate is temperate and favourable to agriculture, and extensive and fertile arable land forms some 32 per cent of her area. Forests and grazing lands abound, while the Anatolian hills contain rich deposits of mineral wealth which, for diversity and value, give Turkey a high place among mineral producing countries.

Istanbul, despite its decline since the last war, remains the largest town, with 741,000 inhabitants, and is still important as a port and commercial centre. Smyrna (Izmir in Turkish), the chief port of Anatolia, has 171,000, and Ankara, the new capital, has already 123,000, and is increasing rapidly. Four other towns—Adana, Bursa, Konya and Ayntap—have populations varying between 50 and 100,000. Turkey differs from most of the States of S.E. Europe in that she is on the whole under-

populated. Despite a rapid increase in numbers in recent years, the density of population remains low. A further increase is, however, expected.

. . . . .

Despite its richness in natural resources, Turkey was for long poor and undeveloped, and up to the present day only a part of its natural resources have been tapped. For this condition the incapacity of the Imperial Government and the devastation of ceaseless wars are largely to blame. The Nationalists, as we saw, succeeded to power in a ruined country, without capital, businessmen or technicians, and hampered both by the sparsity and backwardness of its population.

It is said that at the Conference of Lausanne, when the Turkish delegate demanded the abolition of European economic privileges in Turkey, one of the European delegates said: "Even if we grant you that, before long you yourselves will come and ask us to resume them." If this was to be prevented, a rapid development of the economic resources of the country was needed. This was undertaken without delay, and with remarkable energy and success. An Economic Planning Bureau was set up in Ankara, which worked unceasingly for the improvement of economic conditions. Aid of every kind—financial, fiscal and technical—was given to existing branches of production, and an elaborate and carefully planned scheme of production was set afoot. In order to save Turkey from falling once more under the control of outside interests all this was done without any borrowings from abroad. The people of Turkey submitted to abnormally high taxation, and contributed freely to their Government, in order that their country might acquire its economic equipment without mortgaging its products in advance. Until recently no loans or credits were accepted from abroad.

(1) Agriculture

Up to the present day Turkey remains predominantly an agricultural country, and between 70 and 80 per cent

of its population live by agriculture. In the words of B. Shükrü Kaya, then Minister of the Interior and Secretary-General of the People's Party:—

> The village is the source of all our food and all our raw materials; it is the chief exporter, the best and most reliable customer. It is the basis of the army. It provides a livelihood for 70 per cent of the population. In a word, the village is Turkey.[1]

The Kemalist Government, recognizing the primary importance of this branch of economic life, had devoted great care to it. The cultivated area has been greatly extended—from 5.3 per cent of the total area in 1927 to 10.2 per cent in 1936—and cultivation is still advancing rapidly. The fullest support is being given to the cultivator. The Turkish peasant, who had hitherto relied on the most primitive methods of cultivation, was suddenly confronted with large numbers of tractors and other modern implements, and was instructed in their use. Agricultural co-operatives and credit-banks were set up, silos were built, and irrigation improved. New crops were introduced, and advantageous arrangements made for the marketing of Turkish products. As a result Turkish agricultural production has risen to unprecedented figures.

The chief crops fall into three groups—cereals, vegetables, and industrial crops, as follows: cereals, 89.5 per cent of the cultivated area; vegetables, 3.9 per cent, industrial crops, 6.6 per cent. Anatolia has for centuries been one of the granaries of the Near East, and was once the chief source of food of the Byzantine Empire. Its range of climate gives it a wide choice of cereals, including hot, temperate and cold weather products. The chief cereal crops are, in order, wheat, barley, rye, maize and oats, with a production figure running into many millions of tons per year. In wheat Turkey is quite self-supporting, and in 1937 exported 104,000 metric tons. The barley crop, too, is increasing considerably every year. In the year 1938-9, Turkish wheat and barley crops formed 2.5 per cent and 5.5 per

[1] December 1936.

cent respectively of the world output, and from one half to two-thirds of the Near Eastern output.

Fruits and vegetables are also cultivated to an increasing extent, notably figs, olives, vines and apricots. It is in Western Anatolia that the famous pipless Sultana grapes grow. The dried raisins made from these are exported to many countries. The Smyrna district, the very name of which is intimately associated with figs in the minds of constipated Englishmen, contains forests of fig-trees, from which many hundreds of millions of figs are picked every year. Most of them are dried, and after careful grading and packing, exported. Olives, for olive oil, are cultivated all over the country, and in 1938-9 Turkish olive oil formed 5.3 per cent of the world output. Turkey is by far the chief producer in the Near East of this important Mediterranean commodity, and offers serious competition to Italian exports in that area. Hazel nuts form some 10 per cent of Turkish exports.

Perhaps even more important are the so-called industrial crops, of which tobacco, cotton, poppy and sugar-beet are the chief. Turkish tobacco is universally known and appreciated. The crop is grown in many parts, the best types coming from the Black Sea and Aegean seaboards, and notably from Samsun, a town famous in modern Turkish history. The Black Sea crop amounts to more than a tenth of the total, and is used in producing high grade blends. The preparation of tobacco and making of cigarettes form a State monopoly, all manufacture and sale of tobaccos outside the monopoly being strictly forbidden. Under the Empire the monopoly was in the form of a concession to a foreign company. It has now been taken over by the Republic. The new administration, which took over in 1925, made many changes. Plant was extended and improved, and several added to the original four factories. Special care was devoted to the health of the employees, who had suffered greatly from dust-poisoning in the old insanitary workshops. Production and export figures have shown a marked increase. In 1938 the tobacco

crop reached 74,000 tons--2.6 per cent of the world output, and 27.1 per cent of the total value of Turkish exports. America was the chief customer, followed by Italy, Germany, Holland and Scandinavia. The area under cotton has increased from 36 square miles in 1927 to 980 in 1937. The chief centres are Smyrna and Adana. The quality of Turkish cotton has been much improved by seed selection and suitable international arrangements protect price levels. Production has reached 60,000 tons per annum, or 0.5 per cent of the world output, and cotton accounts for 7.1 per cent of the value of Turkish exports. The country is almost self-sufficing in cotton, and exports large quantities in normal times to England, Italy and Russia. It should be noted that the area under cotton cultivation is capable of considerable extension. Sugar production rose from 5,000 tons in 1923 to 70,000 in 1937, and Turkey is now almost self-sufficing in this respect. The costs of production are, however, as yet too high to make sugar exports economically practical. Finally, we may note an annual crop of some 400 tons of opium.

The ravages of war left little of the flocks that lived on the vast pasture lands of central Anatolia. Progress is, however, being made. An efficient veterinary service and aid by breeding experts from the Ministry of Agriculture have improved matters, and Turkey is now relatively well supplied with live-stock. Turkish wool forms 1.7% of the world output and 4.9% of Turkish exports (in value). America is again the chief customer, with Bulgaria, France, Italy and England much lower in the scale. The famous Angora goat supplies nearly 5,000 tons of mohair each year, some three-quarters of which come to England, the rest going to Germany, U.S.A. and France.

(2) Minerals

Anatolia is extremely rich in minerals, some of which are already being produced, and others in course of development. The most important mineral product so far is chrome-ore, a mineral which is of vital importance

in steel production. The Turkish chrome-ore deposits, which were discovered in 1848, are still among the richest in the world, and Turkish production varies between 15% and 25% of the world output. The other chief sources of supply are Rhodesia and South Africa, while smaller deposits exist in Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Greece. In 1937 Turkey produced 193,000 tons, and exported 198,000 tons (drawing on stocks), worth 4 million Turkish pounds. Twenty-four deposits are being worked, though 117 are known to exist. In 1937 Turkey exported one third of its chrome-ore to Germany, thus supplying the Reich with nearly one half of its total imports of this mineral. In 1938 the figure dropped to one-third of German imports, and it may be assumed that figures have dropped very sharply since then. It should be noted that Germany is entirely dependent on foreign supplies for this important commodity. The supplementary clauses to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish agreement provide for the sale of a large proportion of Turkish chrome-ore to the Allies.

Besides chrome-ore, Turkey has large supplies of copper, lead, zinc, and other metals. Important deposits of bituminous coal are to be found in the Eregli-Zonguldak area, on the Black Sea. Elaborate arrangements are being made by the Turkish Government to facilitate the development of these mines. A coal-port has been built at Zonguldak, and railway facilities will be provided. A vast increase in production figures may be expected in the near future, as conditions of exploitation improve. The coal is of good quality, and is already approaching a production figure of 2½ million tons, of which some three-quarters of a million are exported, mainly to Greece and Italy. A great deal of it will be used by the new steel works at Karabük, which will use iron ore from the recently opened mines at Divriki, in Eastern Turkey. The coal and iron deposits at Eregli and Divriki are estimated to contain 1.5 milliard tons and 15 million tons respectively, and a great increase in output may be anticipated. Copper mines are being worked in three places, and lignites are produced for home consumption. Other minerals, e.g., sulphur, are produced and exported in small quantities.

(3) INDUSTRY

From the earliest days of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his associates realized that if Turkey was to hold her own in the modern world, some degree of industrialization was necessary. From a relatively early date efforts were made to harness the industrial resources of the country. But, as we have seen, conditions were difficult. The minorities who provided skilled workers, experts and business men had gone, and there was hardly any capital in the country. The only chance seemed to be to grant concessions to foreign investors. This policy was, however, resolutely set aside, and by dint of great efforts and privations the Turkish Government was able to assume itself the chief rôle in the industrialization of the country. It is here that we find the real meaning of *'Etatisme'* in the programme of the People's Party. *'Etatisme'* means the emergence of the State as a pioneer and director of industrial activity, in the interests of national development and national defence, in a country where private enterprise and capital were too weak to do anything effective. The measure of industrialization achieved in Turkey during the last 17 years is almost entirely the work of the State, and of the various banks and directorates set up by it for the accomplishment of its industrial ends.

During the ten years from 1923 to 1933, the State was concerned mainly with railway construction (see below). Something, however, was achieved. A sugar industry was set up, and the tobacco, match and alcohol monopolies were organized. Among several armament factories established, the most important was the aircraft factory at Kayseri, which now employs about 1,000 men, and builds planes of all kinds. Engines, instruments and raw materials have still to be imported however. During this period there was also some expansion of privately controlled industrial undertakings,

mainly on a small scale. In 1934 the Government adopted the first five-year plan of industrialization, which was completed in 1939. The plan had a budget of 64,000,000 Turkish pounds, and had a double purpose —(a) the production of consumable goods, and (b) the building up of means of production. In the words of the Turkish Government report: "The main lines of the programme, and the extent of the projected industries, were determined solely by the desire to enable the country to meet its own requirements. . . . The plan envisages the erection of factories which use raw materials produced in the country."

By far the most important items in the Plan were the development of a cotton textile industry (group a) and the installation of an iron and steel plant (group b). Three large textile factories exist at Kayseri, Eregli and Nazilli, and other smaller ones elsewhere for cotton, wool, and linen goods. The steel plant at Karabük, which was constructed by a British firm, was opened on September 9th, 1939. It cost some 22 million Turkish pounds, and will have an annual output of 150,000 tons. It will use the coal from Eregli and the iron from Divriki, and will suffice for the whole internal consumption of Turkey. It is, it may be noted, the only steel plant in the Near East.

Other industries—paper, cardboard, cellulose and artificial silk—have already been established, and further plans include electrical and chemical development, mineral production, motors, new ports and armament factories.

Turkey has thus already achieved a considerable industrial output, and is expanding it rapidly. As yet very little is available for export, either to belligerents or neutrals. But the alliance of the chief industrial power in the Near East is a factor worth taking into consideration.

(4) Transport and Communications

In the Ottoman period railway construction had been left entirely to foreign concessionaires. British, French and German companies had built railways in the western and southern parts of Anatolia, in order to transport the agricultural products of these regions. The Germans had also a strategic aim in mind, and hoped by the construction of the famous Baghdad railway to link Baghdad by rail with Istanbul and thus with Berlin. Part of the Baghdad railway was completed by 1918.

With the break-up of the old Empire, Turkey was left with the Anatolia railway, running from Haydar Pasha (on the Anatolian side of the Bosphorus, opposite Istanbul), to Konya, and thence through the Taurus tunnel to Aleppo in Syria. From Eskishehir a branch line led to Ankara, while another, from Afyon-Karahisar joined with the French line to Smyrna. Local railways in the west continued to function. There were no lines at all in central or eastern Turkey, or near the Black Sea coast. The lines, constructed by different companies, had different purposes, mainly connected with export, and did not link up into a coherent system. When the Republic took over, the lines were disorganized, rolling stock was inadequate and out of date and almost out of use.

The lack of an adequate railway system was felt in several wars, including the War of Liberation, to be a serious strategic handicap. For this, as well as for economic reasons, the Republican Government decided to embark on a programme of railway construction. Although impeded by a lack of technicians and by their determination not to borrow foreign money, the Turks managed to extend their system considerably. The length of line was increased from 2,537 miles in 1923 to 4,346 miles in 1938. For details of the new lines the reader is referred to the map. Particular importance, however, is to be attached to the line leading from Ankara eastwards to Erzerum, near the Eastern frontier, where it joins the Russian-bullt railway to Transcaucasia. This line, which was only completed last year, after the outbreak of war, is of considerable importance, and links up the eastern provinces with the capital and the sea. Other lines are mainly economic in character, and are connected with mining and industrial centres.

The roads, which under the old regime were few in numbers and poor in condition, have been improved to some extent, and steps are being taken to provide adequate road communication between important points. A road to the Iranian frontier is now being completed.

Aviation is being fostered by the Government and by private organizations like the *Türk Kushu* (Turkish Bird), a popular flying club. Turkish air services link the three cities of Istanbul, Ankara and Smyrna.

By 1923, the Turkish merchant marine was reduced to 50,000 tons. In 1933, the figure had risen to a gross tonnage of 174,117 tons, and by 1938 to a quarter of a million tons. The port of Smyrna shows increasing activity, and ports like Samsun, Eregli and Mersin are also growing.

(5) Foreign Trade And Finance

The chief wealth of Turkey is agricultural, and agriculture still provides her largest exports. Tobacco and cereals form the largest percentages, followed by raw cotton and wool and dried fruits. The chief non-agricultural product is chrome-ore. The chief imports are iron and steel, machinery, manufactured cotton and chemicals. In 1938 Turkish imports came chiefly from the following countries, in order: Germany (47%), United Kingdom (11.2%), U.S.A. (10.5%), Italy (4.8%), Czecho-Slovakia (3.9%), U.S.S.R. (3.9%). Exports were distributed as follows: Germany (42.9%), U.S.A. (12.3%) Italy (10%), U.S.S.R. (3.5%), United Kingdom (3.4%), Czecho-Slovakia (3.4%), France (3.3%).

It will thus be seen that about half of Turkish trade was with Greater Germany. It was conducted on the well-known German system of clearing agreements, and tended to place Turkey in danger of German economic control. German firms moreover obtained contracts to build ships and rolling stock, naval bases, railways, etc. In October 1938 Dr. Funk arranged for the granting to Turkey of a credit of 150,000,000 marks—presumably to offset the British credits of the same year. The Turks, however, realized the economic danger that threatened

them, and the resultant political threat. The German credit was not drawn upon, and the reaction showed itself in other ways. The contract for the Karabük steel-works was given to the British firm of Brassert, a tender from Krupps being rejected. Protests were made against German encroachments, and several contracts withdrawn. A credit of £16,000,000 was accepted in England in June 1938, and steps taken to develop Anglo-Turkish trade. Arrangements were made for the repayment of the British credit by the sale of Turkish goods.

The last few months have seen a considerable change in the economic position of Turkey. The Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of October 19th, 1939, was followed by financial and trade agreements in January and February of 1940, providing for an allied credit of £25 million to cover supplies of war material and a loan in gold of £15 million. Arrangements were made for the diversion of Turkish chrome-ore and agricultural produce to England and France.

The British naval blockade cannot prevent Turkish supplies from reaching Germany. The Turks, however, are themselves reducing this trade considerably, and it may be noted that many German firms in Turkey have closed down. On August 31st, 1939, the Turco-German trade agreement expired and Turkey on the outbreak of war refused to renew it. Exports to Germany in consequence dropped considerably and in the absence of clearing agreements German purchases in Turkey were fraught with difficulty. The *Südost-Echo* of Vienna in its issues of the 22nd and 29th September, 1939, complains that commercial exchanges between the two countries have fallen almost to nil. The Turco-German agreement of January 1940 related only to the clearing up of outstanding balances and was not a long-term agreement.

The entry of Italy into the war on June 11th, 1940, interrupted sea communication between Turkey and the West and placed new difficulties in the way of Turkish trade. It was thus found necessary to resume commercial relations with Germany to some extent. At the time of writing negotiations are in progress for a new

trade agreement providing for the exchange of goods to a total value of about 22 million Turkish pounds. Under this agreement Turkey will receive from Germany machinery and rolling-stock of a kind unobtainable from Britain owing to war requirements. The new agreement will not apparently involve Turkey in exporting to Germany chrome-ore and other minerals necessary for war industries. These will continue to be sent to England under the Anglo-Turkish arrangement. Nor, it seems, will it involve any danger of Turkey falling under German economic domination.

It is as yet too early to say how far Turkish trade relations with Germany will develope in view of the new Mediterranean situation created by the entry of Italy into the war. The general trend of events, however, would seem to indicate a gradual decrease in Turco-German trade, and in any case the diversion of Turkish mineral products from Germany to Britain is assured.

CHAPTER IV

TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

"The policy of friendship and rapprochement *which the Republican Government is following in the East, has recently acquired a fresh strength: the four-Power Pact we have signed at Sa'dabad with our Afghan, Iraqian and Iranian friends, is one of the instruments of peace which deserves to be signalized with the greatest satisfaction.*

"We feel certain that the co-operation between the Governments of the Powers grouped round this Pact, all of which pursue the same aim and sincerely desire the peaceful development of their countries, will also in the future bring forth gratifying results."

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
November 1937.

"The Pact of Sa'dabad, well-known instrument of British Imperialism in the Middle East. . . ."

La Tribuna, Rome.
8th May, 1940.

In 1517, Selim the Grim, Sultan of the Ottomans, led his armies southward, and, by overthrowing the Egyptian Empire of the Mamluks, incorporated the Arabic-speaking provinces of Egypt, Palestine and Syria in the Ottoman Empire. In the following century the Arab province of Iraq was annexed from Persia. A vague suzerainty was also claimed over the Arabian peninsula, and particularly over the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the protection of which was one of the prerogatives of the Caliph of Islam. For several centuries the Turks held a fitful sway in those regions, sometimes maintaining direct rule through Turkish Pashas, often having to content themselves with indirect control of local chieftains. In the wild deserts of Arabia it was never found possible to maintain effective direct rule, and power remained in the hands of virtually independent tribal sheikhs.

The first country to break away was Egypt, which in the early 19th century achieved an autonomous status under a dynasty founded by Muhammad Ali Pasha, the creator of modern Egypt and of its Royal House. The Pashas of Egypt, or, as they were later called, the Khedives, failed, however, to maintain the financial independence of their country, and in 1882 a period of British Occupation began. From 1882 to 1914, Egypt was nominally an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire, but was effectively administered and garrisoned by the British, with a remarkable degree of success. On the outbreak of war between England and Turkey, Ottoman suzerainty was declared at an end, and Egypt made a British Protectorate.

In 1917, exactly four hundred years after the Turkish occupation, British troops advancing from Egypt entered the confines of Palestine, and on October 9th, 1917, for the first time since the Crusades, a Christian force, under the command of General Allenby, captured the city of Jerusalem. By the end of 1917 most of Palestine had been occupied, and in the following year the conquest of Syria carried the British forces northward as far as Aleppo, which was entered on October 26th, 1918. Mili-

tary assistance was received by the British from Arab rebels, fighting for Arab independence from the Turks, as well as from a Jewish battalion, fired by British promises to set up a Jewish national home in Palestine. Meanwhile in the east the conquest of Iraq was achieved by British and Indian forces operating from India. The liberation of the Arab lands had been accomplished. There remained the problem of settling their subsequent fate.

Here, as with the Turks, the Allies were hampered by conflicting promises and agreements. Independence had been promised to the Arabs in a large but vaguely defined area, a National Home had been promised to the Jews in Palestine. A secret agreement—the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement—provided for a partition of the Arab lands into British and French dependencies and spheres of influence. The Arabs, awakened from their long torpor, were inspired by a spirit of national revival, and a powerful desire to achieve independence in all Arab areas. The Jews, longing to put an end to two thousand years of exile and persecution, sought the fulfilment of the hopes that had been raised in them by Allied promises. After lengthy negotiations and some serious armed clashes between Allied and Arab forces, the new political structure of the Arab world was set up. Iraq was to be a kingdom, with Baghdad as its capital, and under British Mandate pending the granting of full independence. Palestine, with its eastern extension in Transjordan, was under British Mandate too, the latter under an Arab prince, the former under the direct rule of a British Administration pledged to facilitate the setting up of a Jewish National Home. Egypt, while remaining for the moment a British Protectorate, was also promised independence, and its ruler was recognized as a king. Syria was placed under French Mandate pending the establishment of a Syrian Republic, while the interior of Arabia retained its independent status, now internationally recognized. We may now examine these post-war states in greater detail, with particular reference to those bordering on Turkey.

Syria-Lebanon

Syria was divided by the French Mandatory Government into two main areas, the Republics of Syria and of the Greater Lebanon. The former has a population of 2½ million, and has its capital at Damascus. The latter, with some 800,000 inhabitants, has Beirut as capital. Indigenous governments were set up in 1926 and 1928 respectively. Real power, however, remained in the hands of the French High Commissioners.

Syria's frontiers are—in the North, Turkey; in the East, the friendly Arab State of Iraq; in the South, Palestine and Transjordan; in the West the Mediterranean Sea. The country is linked together by an excellent road system, and her roads and railways provide a vital channel of communication between Turkey and British-occupied Palestine. Air and motor services link Damascus with Baghdad, from which it is separated by hundreds of miles of desert. The Lebanese harbour of Beirut is a good one and is protected by fortifications on the Lebanon. It is of some importance in Mediterranean trade. Smaller harbours are to be found in Tripoli (not to be confused with Italian Tripoli in North Africa) and Latakia. The excellent harbour of Alexandretta, in the North, now part of Turkey, was until recently Syrian. There is a military air base at Rayak, and a sea-plane base at Tripoli.

Syria and the Lebanon are on the whole poor countries, and are thinly populated. Trade is of little importance, though some Turkish products travel through Syria on the way to Palestine and U.S.A. Trade is mainly with France, Japan, England and the neighbouring States. An important feature is the pipe-line from Iraq, one branch of which reaches the sea at Tripoli, and is intended to meet French requirements. When, on July 4th of this year, the French authorities in Syria confirmed their intention of standing by the Pétain Government, immediate steps were taken to divert the oil from Tripoli, so that it would all go to Haifa.

The overwhelming majority of the Syro-Lebanese population is Arabic-speaking, and is impelled by a strong desire to achieve independence. There are, however, many religious minorities. Many Christian sects are represented—Maronites, Catholics, Orthodox, Armenians, Chaldaeans, Protestants, etc., and parts of Syria seem a veritable museum of Byzantine heresiology. There are also several Muslim minorities, the Druzes in in the South and the Alawites in the North-West being the largest. These, and other complicating factors, have made Syria a difficult country to administer, and its record since the last war has not been a happy one. A serious revolt was quelled by the French with some difficulty in 1925, and riots and strikes occurred as late as 1936. Constitutional governments were set up in the Lebanon and Syria in 1926 and 1928, and late in 1936, thanks to the efforts of the Blum Government in Paris, Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese Treaties were drawn up. These Treaties, which were modelled on the British treaties with Iraq and Egypt, provided for the gradual accomplishment of independence by the two States, while safeguarding certain French strategic and commercial rights. They were, however, never implemented. The increasingly threatening character of the international situation made a weakening of the French hold on Syria seem inadvisable to many French statesmen, and with the change of government in France, the ratification of the Treaty was postponed indefinitely. In 1939, after a series of cabinet crises in Damascus, the Syrian and Lebanese Constitutions were suspended, and the new High Commissioner, M. Puaux, resumed direct rule. These measures, and the closing of the Syrian Parliament, caused much dissatisfaction, and many feared open rebellion.

We may now turn a moment to glance briefly at Turco-Syrian relations in the past. From the beginnings of the Kemalist movement, the Turks made it quite clear that they had no intention of restoring the old Ottoman rights over the Arab lands. Their aim was a free Turkey —not a second Ottoman Empire. Relations between

the Kemalists and the Arabs were thus cordial, and in 1919 Turkish Nationalists and Arab Nationalists actually collaborated in an attempt to prevent the establishment of the French Mandate in the region of Antioch. This friendship was, however, short-lived, and already in 1920 the question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta led to fierce struggles between Turks and Arabs in the district. The Sanjak (a Turkish administrative district) of Alexandretta lies at the point where the Turco-Syrian frontier meets the sea. It occupies a vital strategic position, dominating the plain of Northern Syria, and the entrances to Asia Minor. It contains the Port of Alexandretta, one of the finest natural harbours in the Near East, and the natural outlet for the whole surrounding district. It is connected by rail with the main lines leading to Ankara and Istanbul in Turkey, Aleppo, Damascus and Haifa in Syria and Palestine, and through them with Egypt and Iraq. It also contains the ancient city of Antioch, and a number of smaller places.

A fifteenth-century historian tells us that in that part of Syria north of Latakia Turkish was spoken as much as Arabic. Up to the present day the population of the Sanjak is very mixed. Both Turks and Arabs claim a majority, and exact statistics are difficult to obtain. As we saw, a conflict between the two nations in the area began in 1920. On October 20th, 1921, the treaty of Ankara between France and Turkey[1] contained the following article :—

> A special administrative regime shall be instituted in the region of Alexandretta ; the inhabitants of Turkish race of the region shall enjoy all facilities for the development of their culture ; the Turkish language shall have an official character.

In this first post-war agreement, regulating the Turco-Syrian frontier, the question of the Sanjak was thus in a sense reserved. In the years that followed, the Turks showed themselves on the whole content with the arrangement, and busied themselves with internal reforms. Turkish cultural influence was strong in the Sanjak. The

[1] See p. 28.

secularist reforms enacted in the Republic were voluntarily submitted to by many Turks in the Sanjak, and Turkish books and newspapers, permeated with the spirit of the new Turkey, were widely read.

In 1925 a Mixed Commission of Delimitation set to work on the Syrian-Turkish frontier, and for a while there were some minor frontier disputes. The French High Commissioner in Syria at that time, M. de Jouvenel, paid a visit to Ankara, and on May 30th, 1926, a Franco-Turkish Agreement was signed. This provided for certain minor frontier rectifications, and for a pledge of benevolent neutrality by either party in the event of an attack on the other by a third. The question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta was left substantially as in the Agreement of 1921.

After many years of peace, certain skirmishes between Turks and Arabs occurred in 1934, and relations began to deteriorate. The crisis really began, however, in 1936 with the drafting of the Franco-Syrian Treaty. This abortive treaty, the purpose of which was to end the French Mandate, and set up an independent Syria, was obviously going to change the status of the Sanjak, and the Turks were determined to have their say in the matter. The treaty provided for the autonomy of the Sanjak within the framework of the Syrian Republic. On September 23rd, 1936, Hashim Atasi, the Syrian President, made a further declaration to that effect during a visit to Ankara. This statement was the signal for a vigorous campaign in the whole Turkish Press against the new arrangement. From that time on the crisis grew steadily more serious. In the Sanjak itself Turks and Arabs crystallized into two compact and opposite blocks, violently hostile to each other. Throughout Syria and the Arab world beyond it a campaign was started for the preservation of the Sanjak in Syria, while in Turkey the Press and Government were equally firm in upholding the rights of the Turkish section of the population. The present writer was in the Sanjak when the crisis was at its height. Turks in hats and Arabs in fezzes proclaimed by their headgear their

allegiance to secularist Ankara or Muslim Damascus, and the wandering foreigner found it advisable to go bareheaded. The question was eventually referred to the League of Nations. A commission visited the Sanjak, and on May 29th, 1937, agreement was reached at Geneva, setting up an autonomous Republic in the Sanjak (or, as the Turks call it, Hatay), guaranteed both by France and Turkey.

The question, however, was by no means settled. A bitter controversy was carried on in the Turkish and Syrian Press, and Turco-French relations were at times extremely bad. Nor was the position of the Sanjak itself much better. A series of attempts at compromise followed the unsuccessful agreement of May 1937, culminating at last in the complete cession of the region to Turkey on July 21st, 1939. In return for this cession, Turkey promised to respect the integrity of Syria, as newly delimited, and to refrain from any attempt to promote secessionist movements within her frontiers.

This agreement removed the last cause of conflict between Turkey and France, and paved the way for the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Alliance. The Arabs, however, were not entirely pleased. For a while rumours circulated to the effect that Turkey had further plans of expansion in Syria—that the Alliance had secret clauses granting Turkey extensive rights in Syria—that a joint Anglo-Franco-Turkish condominium was contemplated. These and other similar reports have long since been discounted, and despite the regret felt at the loss of Alexandretta, the Anglo-Turkish Alliance is recognized as a great factor of strength and solidity in the Middle East. In Egypt and Iraq, as we shall see, it was welcomed, and before long Arabs in Syria and Palestine added their voices to the chorus of acclamation.

Turco-Syrian relations remained cordial and frequent visits were exchanged between French and Turkish officers. On March 30th, 1940, a Turco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship was signed in Ankara, providing for the final delimitation and surveillance of the frontier and for the organization of transport between the two countries.

On May 18th the chief of the Turkish General Staff visited Beirut, accompanied by the British and French Military Attachés in Turkey, and further military conversations took place.

Despite the discontent prevalent in Syria in the months preceding the outbreak of war, the opening of hostilities saw a complete change in the whole situation. Although they disliked all European Imperialisms, the Arabs infinitely preferred English or French rule to that of Italy or Germany, and it became increasingly clear that there was then no other alternative. As a result the Syrian population spontaneously declared its loyalty to the Allied cause, and carefully refrained from any steps likely to hamper the Allied war effort. Arab volunteers to the number of 20,000 in Syria alone (the figure comes from an Italian source) offered their services to France. Syrian leaders of all parties proclaimed their devotion to the French cause and even the Mufti of Jerusalem, the Palestinian leader then in exile in Syria, declared his loyalty. A large French force, including mechanised and air contingents, was built up in Syria, and was welcomed by the population as a safeguard of their own interests. General Weygand, who arrived in Damascus on September 20th, 1939, was given an enthusiastic reception. This force, which was first under the command of General Weygand and, after his return to France, of General Mittelhauser, maintained close contact with the British forces in Palestine and Egypt, on the one hand, and with the Turkish High Command on the other. Anglo-Franco-Turkish military conversations were frequent, and full collaboration seemed assured. The precise strength of the French forces in Syria is, of course, secret. Estimates vary from 100,000 to 350,000.

On June 23rd, 1940, France signed an Armistice with Germany. The following day M. Puaux, the French High Commissioner in Syria, broadcast a statement to the effect that he and General Mittelhauser were resolved to carry on. A flying visit of General Weygand to Damascus followed, and on June 27th General Mittelhauser declared his support of the Pétain Government. His statement ordered the cessation of hostilities, and declared that there was to be no change on the status of the Mandated territories, which were to remain under the French flag.

The situation in Syria thus remains extremely obscure. A large and well-equipped French force has been immobilised, and its fate remains uncertain. There is evidence of considerable unrest in the country. Much dissatisfaction is reported among French officers and civilians, and the Syrians themselves are not pleased with the possibility of passing under Italian rule. Early in July the murder was reported of Dr. Abdarrahman Shahbandar, a pro-Allied nationalist leader, and German agents are suspected. Prince Adil Arslan, a brother of Prince Shakib Arslan, noted for his pro-Italian proclivities, is active again, and would seem to be assuming a leading role in Syria. German and Italian consular representatives have reached Syria, with much inflated staffs.

An enemy Power installed in Syria would be in a position to offer a serious threat to the Allies. Syria would provide an excellent base for propaganda and sabotage throughout the Near East, and could serve, moreover, as a jumping-off ground for attacks on Palestine, Iraq or Turkey. The southern frontier of Turkey is manned on the assumption that Syria is controlled by a friendly Power, and a determined enemy once installed there could be very dangerous.

The neighbours of Syria were not slow to react. As early as June 21st it was announced that the Foreign Minister (General Nuri-as-Said) and the Minister of Justice (Sayyid Naji Shawkat) of Iraq were going to Ankara on a special mission. On their return journey they halted in Aleppo, Beirut and Damascus, and had conversations with the French High Commissioner, with leading Syrian politicians including Prince Adil Arslan, and with the British, Turkish, and Iraqi consuls. An official statement published in Baghdad on their return said that there was complete identity of opinion between the two Governments. On July 5th the Iraqi Foreign Minister made an

additional statement to the effect that Turkey and Iraq were agreed that Syria should have complete independence. These views had been communicated to M. Puaux, to Syrian leaders, and to other Middle Eastern Powers.

On July 1st the British Foreign Office issued the following statement, after consultation with the Iraqi and Turkish Governments: "His Majesty's Government declare that they could not allow Syria and the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile Power or to be used as a base for attacks upon those countries in the Middle East which they are pledged to defend, or to become the source of such disorder as to constitute a danger to those countries. They therefore hold themselves free to take whatsoever measures they may in such circumstances consider necessary in their own interests. Any action they may hereafter be obliged to take . . . will be entirely without prejudice to the future status of the territories now under French Mandate."

The immediate future of Syria thus remains uncertain, and will depend largely on the attitude of Turkey. Both Turkey and Britain have already made it abundantly clear that they will not tolerate the installation of an enemy-power in Syria. The possibilities for the moment seem to be (1) an independent Syria, with an Anglo-Turco-Iraqi guarantee, (2) an annexation of Syria by Iraq—a step that would realize one of the dearest aspirations of Arab nationalists, (3) some form of foreign (non-Axis) control. In any case we may be sure that any attempt at an Axis landing in Syria would be vigorously resisted.

(2) Palestine And Transjordan

Continuing Syria and the Lebanon southwards lie the British Mandated territories of Palestine and Transjordan. The latter is an autonomous Arab State with a population of some 300,000. It is ruled by an Arab Prince, Amir Abdallah, a brother of the late King Faisal of Iraq. The country is poor and undeveloped, though great progress has been made during the last 20 years in

setting up an ordered government. The Amir is a loyal ally of Britain, and as early as September 1939, in a speech at Amman, his capital, proclaimed his support of the democracies. "My people stand beside democracy in this struggle against oppression. . . . We will support our democratic allies until the end. Every one of us is well aware that the Muslim peoples depend on the support of the democracies, which have begun to undo the fetters that enslave the peoples of the East. . . . Immediate liberty depends on the victory of the democracies . . . otherwise the East will be helpless and fall an easy prey."

Palestine proper forms the western half of the Mandated territory and is bounded by Syria, Transjordan, Egypt and the sea. It has a population of about 1½ millions, and several large towns—Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and Tel-Aviv. Haifa is the outlet of the Iraq pipeline, and has large oil stores and refineries. It is also an important British naval base. There is an air base at Ramleh, and a civil airport at Lydda.

We are not concerned here with the sad story of Palestinian internal politics. As is well-known, the country is claimed on historical and national grounds by both Jews and Arabs, and the last twenty years—more particularly the last ten—form a bitter record of bloodshed and internecine strife. The problem is still by no means solved, and Palestine remains under the direct control of the British High Commissioner. The disturbed state of the country before the outbreak of war necessitated the maintenance of large forces there, amounting in 1938 to 15 battalions of infantry, besides an armoured car company, an R.A.F squadron, and police.

In Palestine as in Syria, the events of September 1939 wrought a complete change. Arab-Jewish conflict lessened considerably, and Arabs and Jews competed with each other in expressions of loyalty to the British cause. Many, including a strikingly high percentage of the Jewish population, volunteered for service, and some have been incorporated in the British forces. A mixed Arab-Jewish Palestinian force served in France. The entry of Italy into the war on the side of Germany brought the

Axis threat much closer to Palestine, and renewed the determination of Arabs and Jews to fight with England to the end. The first air raid on Palestine, in July of this year, saw full Arab-Jewish co-operation in the A.R.P. services.

It may be assumed that unusually strong British forces are now stationed in Palestine, and it is from Palestine that any joint Anglo-Turkish measures regarding Syria would have to be taken from the British side. Like its French counterpart in Syria, British Headquarters in Palestine has been in close touch with Turkish military circles.

Turkish interest in Palestine is slight, although the country was Ottoman until 1918. At various times Turkish newspapers have shown a friendly interest in Jewish endeavours, and a few months ago the Turkish commercial attaché in Cairo paid a friendly visit to Tel-Aviv, with a view to improving economic relations between the two countries. Jewish colonization has brought a considerable economic development and some measure of industrialization. Such relations should therefore be of value to both parties. Mention may also be made of an arrangement last year whereby Turkish and Jewish students were exchanged between the two countries.

(3) ARABIA

The largest part of the Arabian peninsula is occupied by the kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia, ruled by King Abd al-Aziz b. Sa'ud, for long an ally of Britain, and now neutral. Despite the relatively backward condition of the Sa'udi Kingdom, it enjoys considerable prestige among Arabs, and many look to Ibn Sa'ud as their natural leader. Recent attempts to include Sa'udi Arabia in the Sa'dabad group were unsuccessful, and the country adheres strictly to its policy of neutrality. The South-Western corner of Arabia is ruled by the Imam Yahya of the Yemen, and Italian influence is reported to be strong here. The remainder of the peninsula consists of British ruled areas (e.g. Aden) or British controlled minor sheikhdoms. Turkish interests are very small.

(4) EGYPT

The kingdom of Egypt, with its sixteen million inhabitants, is the natural leader of the Arab and Muslim States. Lying in the North-Eastern corner of Africa, it occupies a position of great strategic importance. Within its territory are the Suez Canal and the great naval harbour of Alexandria, both essential links in the British system of Imperial defence. Egypt is an independent State, bound to England by a Treaty of Alliance. Since September 1939 Egypt has broken off diplomatic relations with both Germany and Italy. A large part of the British Mediterranean fleet is believed to be stationed in Egyptian waters, and important British forces are in Egypt, including contingents from Australia and New Zealand. Egypt herself has a small army and air-force, which are increasing in strength.

Turco-Egyptian relations were until recently mainly confined to commerce. In August 1939 however, Turkish and Egyptian military missions were exchanged "for study of the situation of the two countries from the military viewpoints and for co-operation in the strengthening of relations between the two armies in the interests of general peace." Since then Turco-Egyptian relations have improved considerably, and Egypt is now in close contact with the Sa'dabad group of Powers (see below).

(5) THE SA'DABAD POWERS

On July 8th, 1937, in the Imperial Palace of Sa'dabad, in Teheran, the capital of Iran, a pact was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. This pact, which is the first to be signed in modern times by independent Middle Eastern States among themselves, is of considerable importance in that area. The signatories bound themselves to respect each other's frontiers and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs ; to consult each other in all international emergencies ; to refrain, whether alone or in alliance with a third party, from all acts of aggression against each other ; to settle all disputes by peaceful means. The Pact was registered with the League of Nations. It was

to remain in force for five years and for another five years after that unless any Party gave six months' notice of denunciation before the end of the first period.

The Pact, it will be seen, is not a military alliance. It is one of non-aggression and good neighbourliness. It does, however, set up a Middle Eastern bloc which is a powerful factor for peace and stability in the region. Two of the signatories, Turkey and Iraq, are now allied to Britain, and another British Ally, Egypt, acts in close collaboration with the Sa'dabad group. Turkey is the recognized leader of the group, and, for that matter of the Middle East, and, in the words of the Muqattam of Cairo, the Anglo-Turkish Agreement brought the whole Middle East on to our side.

The negotiation of the Pact was not without difficulties. Frontier disputes had dragged on for several years between Iran and Iraq, and at an earlier date, between Turkey and Iraq. A Turco-Iranian boundary dispute was settled on January 23rd, 1937, and that between Iraq and Iran only four days before the signature of the Pact. There was undoubtedly a connection between the conclusion of the Pact and the beginning of Italian aggression in Abyssinia, which brought the Fascist threat to the Middle East once more to the fore.

It would not be out of place to look a little more closely at the signatories of the Pact.

(a) *Iraq*

The Kingdom of Iraq (3½ millions, capital Baghdad) is the only Arab State in the group, and is tacitly understood to represent the other Arab States. Iraq has treaty relations with Sa'udi Arabia, and has always taken a close interest in events in Syria and Palestine. This interest has been made particularly clear during the last few weeks.

Iraq, which includes the historic centres of the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires, is the largest of the Arab States carved out of the Ottoman Empire after the last war. It lies in the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the two great rivers of Mesopotamia, and

stretches westward into the desert. It is bounded in the East and North by Iran and Turkey, and in the West and South by Syria, Transjordan, and the desert kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia. Its only outlet to the sea is on the Persian Gulf, where it meets the British controlled petty Sheikhdom of Kuwait. Its chief cities are Baghdad, the capital; Mosul, an oil centre near the Turkish frontier; and Basra, an important port and air-base on the Gulf. A railway now runs right through Iraq, linking up Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and continuing through Turkey to Istanbul. A branch line runs to the Iranian frontier and road communication is also available with East and West. There are air-ports at Habbaniya and Basra, and Iraq lies on the British Imperial route to India.

Iraq is extremely rich in oil. Although she only stands eighth on the list of world oil producers, the Iraqi deposits are the largest under Allied control. Most of the deposits are worked by the Iraq Petroleum Company. A pipe-line runs westward from Iraq to the Mediterranean coast, with two branches—one to Syrian Tripoli, for French use, the other to Haifa in British controlled Palestine. Only the latter is now working. Iraq has a small but well-organized army and air force, and there are R.A.F. squadrons established at several places.

For some time Iraq was under British Mandate. An Arab dynasty was set up in the country, the first king being Faisal ibn Husain, a capable Arab soldier and administrator who had been one of the leaders of the Arab revolt in 1916. For many years the administration of the country was beset with difficulties. A religious schism cut the Arab majority of the population into two hostile parties, and only recently have the ancient antagonisms begun to die down. The nomadic tribes that inhabit the desert parts of the country also present serious problems, and difficulties were at first experienced with the Kurdish minority in the North. Many Iraqis were moreover by no means satisfied with British rule, and expressed their resentment in no intangible form. Thanks, however, to the skill and diplomacy of the late King Faisal, and to a devoted company of British officials,

some headway was made against all these problems. In 1930 an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance was signed, assuring both the political independence of Iraq and the strategic needs of Great Britain, which retained the right to maintain R.A.F. bases in the country. In 1932 Iraq entered the League of Nations, and now enjoys complete internal independence. In 1933 Faisal died, and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi. After only a few years King Ghazi met his death in a motor-car smash, and the country is now ruled by a Regent, Amir Abdulilah, on behalf of a four-year-old minor, King Faisal II.

For some years after the last war, relations between Turkey and the newly created Kingdom of Iraq, then, be it noted, under British Mandate, were distinctly unfriendly. The chief bone of contention was the city and district of Mosul. In order to understand the full implications of this conflict, it is necessary for us to glance briefly at what may be called the Kurdish problem.

The Kurds are a people of Iranian origin, closely related to the Persians in race and language. They are, however, backward in state, without any culture worth speaking of, and in a low stage of economic development. Numbering some three millions, they have no State of their own, and occupy a country lying at the meeting place of the Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi frontiers. More than half of them live in the eastern provinces of the Turkish Republic, a number are to be found in the Vilayet (district) of Mosul, in Iraq, and the rest in Iran. During recent years even the Kurds have been influenced by the nationalist ferment that is affecting the Near East, and claims were made for Kurdish autonomy in 1919 and 1922. In Iraq these claims were recognized to some extent. Kurdish is an official language in the Kurdish districts, and an important measure of cultural autonomy has been granted. Kurds have co-operated in the building up of the new Iraq, and many have played a leading rôle. In Turkey, as we saw, the Kurds form the only minority of any importance, and relations between them and the Kemalist Government have not always been friendly. While many Kurdish intellectuals have

helped loyally in the construction of Kemalist Turkey, the elements in the east have reacted differently, and on two occasions—in 1925 and 1930—burst into open revolt against what they called the impious and anti-religious government of Ankara. Rightly or wrongly, the Turks believed that the settlement of their own eastern provinces was hindered by the fact that large numbers of Kurds were living under other regimes beyond the frontiers, and at times Iraq and Iran were actually accused of conniving at the organization of Kurdish resistance. Of particular importance was the Iraqi province of Mosul, just beyond the Turkish frontier. This district was claimed by the Turks on several grounds. Mosul, they said, was not occupied by British troops until after the Armistice of Mudros on October 30th, 1918, and therefore should not have been taken from them. Moreover, the Turkish National Pact, while renouncing the Arab lands, claimed all territories inhabited by an Ottoman, non-Arab majority, and it was asserted that the Kurds came under this heading. The British and Iraqi reply was that the Armistice line was by no means intended to be regarded as final, and that the large Arab population of Mosul in any case justified its inclusion in Iraq on ethnic grounds. The situation was further complicated by the fact that there are oil deposits in Mosul, and that the district occupies an important strategic position, commanding the whole of Iraq.

At the Conference of Lausanne, the question of the Turco-Iraqi frontier was left open, for settlement between the Powers concerned, or failing that, by the League of Nations. Many years of wrangling and negotiation followed, during which period both Turco-Iraqi and Turco-British relations deteriorated considerably, at times almost reaching the point of war. In December 1925 the League of Nations awarded the district to Iraq, stipulating certain guarantees for the Kurdish population, and on June 5th, 1926, the main lines of the award were incorporated in an Anglo-Turco-Iraqi Treaty signed in Ankara.

Since the settlement of the Mosul question the history

of Turco-Iraqi relations had been one of steady improvement. After the revolt of 1930, the Kurds of Turkey seem to have settled down under the new regime, and little has been heard of the old problem since that date. In Iraq, many of the higher officers and officials had formerly served under the Ottoman Government, and a certain feeling of sympathy with Turkey began to manifest itself. The signature of the Pact of Sa'dabad in 1937 created treaty relations of a cordial character between the two countries, and laid down the lines of future development. On October 23rd, 1939, the Iraqi Prime Minister sent a telegram of congratulation to the Turkish Government on the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty of Alliance, saying: "The high policy closely affecting Iraq, which was planned by Atatürk and has been successfully carried out by President Inönü . . . has won the appreciation and admiration of all the Iraqis, both government and people." Dr. Saydam, in his reply, said that "the invariably straightforward and friendly policy of our neighbours in Iraq is a strong support for us in safeguarding our common interests." This attitude of Iraq was confirmed a few days later by the Regent, who in a speech from the throne expressed his entire approval of the Treaty, which, he said, "enabled the Near East to regard the future with ease and confidence." The recent collapse of France, and the consequent emergence of a Syrian problem saw, as we have already noticed, the fullest co-operation between the Turkish and Iraqi Governments in meeting the new contingency.

During the years preceding the outbreak of war, there was evidence of much anti-British feeling, and the German diplomatic mission in Baghdad, led by the able Dr. Grobba, formed a centre for German propagandist and other activities in the Near East, and more particularly in the Arab lands. At one time Grobba's influence was considerable. Besides his work in Iraq, he paid a visit to Sa'udi Arabia, and directed German agents in Syria, Palestine and Egypt. The movements of the ubiquitous Herr Paul Schmitz in Cairo, and, after his

expulsion from Egypt, in Beirut, were well worth noting. The German Government expected substantial results from its copious expenditure of money and effort in the Arab lands, and as late as September 7th, 1939, the *Völkischer Beobachter* of Munich reported triumphantly from Baghdad that Iraq would do nothing to help England. Events, however, belied these Nazi hopes. The Iraqis, like the other Arabs, realized full well from what quarter the real threat to their independence came, and did not forget that Baghdad has for long been one of the traditional objectives of German expansion. On the very day when the above-mentioned report appeared, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and expelled or interned German subjects. The German propaganda office was compelled to seek a haven in neutral Iran, and German activities were brought to a halt. Iraq is now at war with Germany.

(b) *Iran*

The history of Iran since the last war provides many parallels with that of Turkey. In both cases a country disorganized by years of maladministration, fallen under foreign control and in imminent danger of dismemberment was rescued by the emergence of a national leader of genius who, in the course of a few years, succeeded in stopping the rot and putting the country firmly on the path of progress.

Iran is bounded in the North by Soviet Russia, in the West by Turkey and Iraq, in the East and South-East by Afghanistan and India. She has outlets on the land-bound Caspian Sea in the North, and on the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in the South. Despite her vast area—more than twice that of Turkey—her population is about 15 millions. The chief towns are Teheran, the capital; Tabriz; Isfahan; Meshed; and Shiraz. Communications, which for long were very poor, have been improved. Roads have been built, linking up the main centres and establishing overland contacts with Turkey and Iraq. Perhaps one of the major achievements of the regime is the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway,

running from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf. This railway was built by the State, without any foreign borrowings at all. Its chief purpose, it would appear, is to make Iran less dependent on Soviet goodwill for her export and import trade, most of which has hitherto passed through Soviet territory.

The most important product of Iran is oil, of which it produces no less than 3.8 per cent of the world output. The deposits are worked by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and a pipe-line leads to Abadan, a port on the Persian Gulf, where there is a refinery and shipping facilities. Iran is the third greatest supplier of British requirements, and with Iraq provided a quarter of Britain's oil imports in 1938. France is even more dependent on Near Eastern sources of supply, and in the same year received no less that 41 per cent of her total imports from the two countries named. The value of these Near Eastern sources of supply to the British scheme of Imperial defence need hardly be stressed. Thanks to the British domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, these supplies can now be cut off from the enemy.

The ruler and creator of modern Iran is Riza Shah Pehlevi, who succeeded to the Imperial throne in 1926. Unlike his Turkish counterpart, Riza Shah retained the monarchic form of government. The tendency to secularisation also has been much less noticeable than in Turkey, and although the power of the religious hierarchy has been reduced, Islam still plays a certain part in Iranian public life. In other spheres the tempo of change has been rapid. Economic and social reconstruction have proceeded very far, and the ancient land of Persia is once more taking its place among progressive nations. Not the least important of Riza Shah's reforms is the creation of a new army, numbering some 100,000 men, and capable of considerable extension, thanks to universal compulsory military service. It is equipped with several hundred Skoda tanks and other mechanical weapons. The air force is small as yet, but growing. It is certain that the new Iran would offer a vigorous

resistance to any attempt at invasion from any quarter.

The foreign policy of Iran has been one of the strictest neutrality. Friendship with her immediate neighbours is assured by the Pact of Sa'dabad. Relations with England are consistently friendly, and are cemented by the co-operation of the two countries in developing the Iranian oil-wells. Friendly contacts are maintained with other Powers, and an Iranian-Japanese Treaty of Friendship was signed in Teheran on October 18th, 1939. A treaty with the Soviet was signed as early as 1921, and confirmed in 1927 by a treaty of mutual guarantee and neutrality. The latter treaty was reaffirmed by M. Molotov in his address to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on March 29th of this year. The Soviet Union has for long been Iran's chief source of supply, and in 1938 provided her with 32.5 per cent of her imports. Moreover most of the other foreign trade of Iran passed through Russia. The opening of the Trans-Iranian Railway and the road to Turkish Trebizond on the Black Sea may reduce this dependence on Soviet transit facilities.

Relations between Iran and Russia at the moment appear to be friendly. As recently as March 25th a new commercial treaty was signed, which had a good Press in both countries. Reports from Europe of troop concentrations and impending hostilities have been vigorously denied in Teheran.

Relations with Turkey, though occasionally marred by disagreements on the Kurdish question, have on the whole been friendly.

The Iranian Imperial Government declared its neutrality on September 4th, 1939, and has adhered to it scrupulously ever since.

(c) *Afganistan*

Afghanistan, a mountain kingdom in Central Asia, has some 7,000,000 inhabitants, and lies between Russia, Iran and British India. It is a buffer State, and its foreign policy has the necessary qualities of resilience in its dealings with Russia and Britain. Relations with

Turkey are on the whole unimportant. Numbers of Afghan cadets have been trained in Turkish military schools, but direct contacts are few. Diplomatic relations are regulated by the Pact of Sa'dabad.

(6) Transcaucasia and the Dodecanese

Before we leave the Middle East, there are two other regions, adjacent to Turkey, that must be considered. Stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian, along the frontiers of both Turkey and Iran, lies the Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of Transcaucasia, containing the Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The total population of the area is about 7 million. The region is extraordinarily rich in natural resources, chief among them being the oil fields at Baku on the Caspian Sea, which produce 70 per cent of Russia's oil, and at Grozhny, the second largest source of oil in Soviet territory. Both wells are connected by pipeline with the Black Sea ports of Batum and Tuapse, as well as with Rostov further north. The Caucasian Railway has its terminus at Poti. Baku is only 125 miles from the Turkish frontier, Batum 15 miles, and Poti 55 miles. The pipelines and railways are all within easy reach of Turkey. It is this vulnerability of the Soviet Transcaucasian frontier that has led to a crop of rumours of impending Soviet attack in the Middle East against Turkey or Iran. So far, however, there has been no sign of aggressive intentions on the part of the Soviet, and quite recently M. Molotov expressly disclaimed any intention of attacking Turkey or Iran.

At the other end of Turkey, in the Aegean Sea, lie the Dodecanese Islands, since 1912 in Italian possession. These islands, now heavily fortified, lie just off the Turkish coast, and have been described by a Turkish statesman as "a loaded pistol levelled at the heart of Turkey." The population is mixed Greek and Turkish, and the retention of these islands by Italy is much resented in Turkey, particularly since recent developments make it reasonable to assume that they are desired mainly as a jumping-off ground for further Italian

expansion in the Near East. They have indeed little other use.

(7) Conclusion

We may now sum up the position of Turkey with regard to her Near and Middle East neighbours. The relations between the Turkish and Arab nations are on the whole not cordial. The memory of the Mosul episode has left behind a suspicion, probably unjustified, that Turkey has further plans of expansion towards the Persian Gulf. More recently the affair of the Sanjak considerably exacerbated relations between the two peoples. The loss of Alexandretta was received with regret and indignation throughout the Arabic-speaking countries, and once more speculation was rife on the possibility of further Turkish aims in Northern Syria.

The events of the last year, however, have tended on the whole to bring about an increased feeling of unity in the face of a common enemy. Arab fears of hypothetical Turkish aggression have faded into insignificance in comparison with the very real threat of Italian "demographic" Imperialism in the Mediterranean and the German advance through the Balkans towards the Middle East. The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Alliance is now generally welcomed in the Arab States, and the Arabs, like their Near Eastern neighbours, regard Turkey as one of the chief bastions of freedom and independence in the region. The cordial relations existing between Turkey and the Arab kingdom of Iraq are a hopeful sign for the future of Arab-Turkish relations generally. Turkish relations with Iran, too, are friendly, although, unlike Turkey, Iran has not as yet associated herself with any group of great Powers.

The precise value of the Pact of Sa'dabad is difficult to assess. As we have seen, the Pact is not one of military alliance, and does not provide for assistance by the others if any one signatory is attacked by an outside Power. Such assistance, however, is by no means improbable, and in any case it may be taken as

assured that a Power attacking any one of the signatories would receive no assistance from any other. During the early months of the present war there were persistent reports to the effect that a meeting of the Sa'dabad Powers was to be held in order to formulate a common attitude to the international situation. After some discussion it was decided to postpone this meeting, though one report from Baghdad asserted that it had been decided to convoke a full meeting of the signatory Powers in the event of a German attack on any of Turkey's Balkan allies—a measure which would obviously bring the danger very much nearer to the Middle Eastern States. In view of the fact that two of the signatory Powers, Turkey and Iraq, are allies of Great Britain, there can be little doubt as to the probable results of any such joint discussion of the Sa'dabad Powers.

The significance of the Sa'dabad Pact has been variously interpreted. Some commentators thinking, no doubt, of the very close bonds of friendship uniting Turkey and the Soviet Union at the date of its signature, have chosen to regard the Pact as a victory of Soviet diplomacy and as a measure intended to limit British influence in the Middle East. Italian commentators, realizing that the Pact helped to consolidate Middle Eastern defences against their own expansionist aims, preferred to interpret it as an instrument of British Imperialism, and pointed triumphantly to the fact that one of the signatories, Iraq, was a military ally of Great Britain. Perhaps it would be truest to say that the Pact represents an attempt by the Powers actually concerned to ensure a greater measure of solidarity among themselves in meeting aggression from any European Power, and to forestall the possibility of a joint attack by a European and Middle Eastern State on another Middle Eastern State. It is only since the source of possible external aggression has been clearly indicated that the Sa'dabad group has come to be associated with Great Britain to an increasing extent.

CHAPTER V

TURKEY AND THE BALKANS

"The Balkan and Polish and Baltic States must be united with Germany in a firm federation—in various forms of semi or apparent sovereignty, economically and militarily dependent on Germany."

A. Rosenberg—1939.

LIKE the Middle East (excluding Iran and Afghanistan), the Balkan Peninsula consists entirely of States carved out of the defunct Ottoman Empire. The movement of national liberation came to South-Eastern Europe earlier than to the Middle East, and by the beginning of the last war Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Greece and Albania were independent States, having won their freedom from Turkish rule in the 19th or early 20th centuries.

The Balkan Peninsula has many peculiar problems of its own. The numerous nationalities that inhabit it are in many parts inextricably mixed, and the difficulty of drawing exact ethnic frontiers has given rise to a number of disputes and wars. The area is still mainly agrarian, and its produce—foodstuffs, live-stock, timber, grain, tobacco and oil are vitally necessary to its great industrial neighbour Germany, which since its absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, is in immediate contact with the Balkan States. The great river Danube, flowing from Germany through the Balkans to the Black Sea forms a natural water-way of the highest strategic and economic importance. Balkan States lie on the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea, and their harbours and islands are of no small significance in the balance of naval and military power in those regions.

Despite the apparent helplessness of the Balkan States in the face of their powerful continental neighbour, the factor of sea-power in the Mediterranean may, as once before, prove decisive in settling their ultimate fate. The

issue has been clearly stated by a well-known German political expert, now in England:

> In a struggle between continental power (however great—yet always limited) and sea power (commanding the seas—spacious and free), sea power has always proved superior to land power (in the case of Napoleon I as in that of William II) and it always will. This was experienced by all the Balkan States in the World War. Take Yugoslavia and Roumania, two States which were at first defeated and occupied and—like Belgium which suffered the same fate—were yet eventually victorious; and the two other States—Turkey and Bulgaria, which were victorious for years but finally defeated. For all five Balkan States the decisive factor in the World War was the British freedom of the seas.[1]

(1) The Balkan States

(a) *Yugoslavia*

The Serb nation recovered its independence in gradual stages during the nineteenth century, full and final recognition being given in 1878. During the last war Serbia, an Allied State, was overrun and occupied by the Central Powers, but the Allied victory in 1918 resulted in the restoration of Serbian independence over a much extended area. The new kingdom, re-named Yugoslavia, acquired large territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and for the first time since the Middle Ages united all the Serbian people under one flag.

Perhaps the chief problem of Yugoslavia in the post-war years was that of minorities. It is the historic misfortune of the Serb nation that the cultural dividing-line between Central and Eastern Europe passes through its centre. The Serbs and Croats, though originally one in nationality and in language, had vastly different cultural and religious traditions. The Serbs are of the Greek Orthodox Church, use the Cyrillic alphabet (that used in Russia), and have a Balkan and Ottoman past. The Croats are Catholic, Latin in culture, and have an

[1] Dr. Ernst Jäckh. The German Drive in the Balkans. *International Affairs* London. Nov.-Dec. 1939.

Austrian and Central European background. The history of the last twenty years has been one of constant struggle and conflict between these two warring sections of the South Slav nation. Other minorities include Slovenes, a South Slav people closely related to the Serbo-Croats, Albanians, Hungarians, Germans and Macedonians—these last claimed by Bulgaria on ethnic grounds.

After several unsuccessful attempts at constitutional government, Yugoslavia is now a modified royal dictatorship, supreme power being exercised, since the murder of King Alexander in 1934, by the Regent on behalf of the boy-King Peter. Since last year the increasing danger from without has resulted in a greater measure of co-operation between Serbs and Croats, and the outlook is hopeful for greater internal harmony. The question of Yugoslav relations with other Powers will be dealt with later.

The strategic position of Yugoslavia is now distinctly weak. She has two land frontiers with Italy—in Albania and in the north, and her only outlet on the sea is on the Adriatic, the entrances to which are under Italian control. She has, moreover, a long land frontier with Germany, crossed by three main railway lines, and another with the hostile state of Hungary. She remains, nevertheless, the strongest of the Balkan Powers, and the most independent. The fighting qualities of the Serb infantry have been proved many times, and the newly acquired friendship of Russia is a factor of strength.

The population of Yugoslavia is about 15,000,000. Her economy is predominantly agricultural, the chief products being wheat, maize, cattle, pigs and timber. Her rich mineral deposits include copper, lead, iron and bauxite, from which aluminium is made. In 1939 about half of Yugoslavia's foreign trade was with Germany.

(b) *Roumania*

The development of Roumania has many points of similarity with that of Yugoslavia. Here, too, we find

a people which, having recovered its independence in the nineteenth century, lost it again to Germany in 1914–1918, and emerged from the war, thanks to the Allied victory, with greatly increased territories. Roumania received Bessarabia from Russia, Transylvania and Bukovina from Austria-Hungary, and recovered the Dobrugea from Bulgaria. Hungarians, Bulgarians and Russians formed large and discontented minorities, and prevented the establishment of any stable form of government. Since 1930, King Carol has been the effective ruler of the country, maintaining a semi-dictatorial regime. Pro-German elements have always been strong among the conservative land-owning classes, and recent events have brought them to the fore again. At the moment Roumania seems to be moving towards a Fascist form of government of the type attempted by M. Goga during his brief spell of office in 1937—although of course Soviet influence may yet be exerted to prevent this.

The population of Roumania, including the recently lost provinces, was just under 20,000,000. The country is in the main agrarian, and suffers from poverty and over-population. The chief crops are wheat and maize, both of which are of great value to Germany. The oil deposits are the largest in Europe outside Russia, and production ranges between 6 and 8 million tons per year. Both Germany and Italy depend to a great extent on Roumanian oil, which is thus of great strategic importance. British and French investments in the country are considerable, though it seems likely that these will now be appropriated. In 1938 26.3 per cent of Roumanian exports went to Germany, and 38.3 per cent of her imports came from that country. Figures for last year are undoubtedly much higher, and Roumania has of late been subjected to intensive German economic pressure.

An important channel of transport is the Danube, which reaches the sea through the Roumanian Dobrugea. Roumania is Germany's route to the Black Sea, and consequently her rail, road and water-ways are the subject of particular German attention.

(c) Bulgaria

Bulgaria was defeated and mutilated both in 1913 and in 1918, and the keynote of Bulgarian politics since the last war has been the campaign for the recovery of the lost provinces. Macedonia was demanded from Greece and Yugoslavia, and Macedonian terrorists working from Bulgaria carried on a fierce struggle against these two countries for several years. A claim more in the news to-day is for the Dobrugea, ceded to Roumania. This area, which has a population of nearly a million, is important both because of its fertile soil and because of its strategic position, containing as it does the lower waters of the Danube and the Black Sea port of Constanta. The Dobrugea is by far the most urgent of Bulgarian claims, and on it depends, more than on anything else, the relations of Bulgaria with the other Balkan States. The recent Soviet action in Roumania has revived hopes in Sofia of a forthcoming gratification of their desires. Another claim of some urgency is for an outlet on the Aegean, to be ceded by Greece.

The Government of Bulgaria is an uneasy combination of Parliamentarism and dictatorship. Her disagreements with her neighbours have in the past rendered her susceptible to German and Italian influences, though of late these seem to be giving place to that of the Soviet Union. The population of Bulgaria is about 6,400,000, of whom 80 per cent live by agriculture. The chief products are cereals, tobacco, grapes, cotton, oil-seeds and rose-oil. There is some industrial output, and few minerals. Foreign trade is largely under State control, and is to a great extent with Germany.

Bulgaria lies in the geographical centre of the Balkan Peninsula, and is in a position to prevent any effective co-operation between the Entente Powers. A friendly Bulgaria, on the other hand, could weld the Balkan Entente into a solid bloc of substantial strength.

(d) Greece

Since her defeat in the Greco-Turkish war of 1920–1922, Greece has seen many political changes. In 1924

a Republic was proclaimed, and constitutional government was maintained for some years, albeit not without difficulty. The restoration of monarchy in 1935 was followed by the setting up of a dictatorship in the following year under General Metaxas. There has been no change since.

French and British cultural influence in the country has always been considerable. Greece is a maritime State with a long Mediterranean seaboard, and is therefore more susceptible to Western influences than are her Balkan neighbours. The memory of Lord Byron and the British Mediterranean fleet are both factors of diverse importance in favour of friendship with England, and the guarantee given to Greece last year could but encourage the historic sympathy of the Greek people for the Democracies.

The population of Greece is of some 7 millions. The chief crop is tobacco, followed by currants, raisins, wine, olive-oil and olives. Cotton is also cultivated, and there is some industrial output. Germany takes a large share of Greek foreign trade, though not as large as in the case of the other Balkan States. The country is on the whole prosperous, and enjoys a relatively high standard of living.

Greek ports and islands are of great importance in the question of Mediterranean sea-power, and the fact that Greece has both a sea and a Turkish frontier is a factor of strength in her political and strategic position.

(*e*) *Albania*

An independent Albanian State was set up in 1913. During the last war the country was occupied at different times by no less than seven armies, and its very existence was in doubt. After the war Italian demands for a mandate were rejected, and an independent Albania was re-established, joining the League of Nations in 1920. In 1928 Ahmed Zog, the first President, was proclaimed King. He retained the throne until expelled by the Italian invasion. Italy early secured a dominating position, and on April 7th, 1939, occupied the country

and incorporated it in the Italian Empire, thus securing a foothold in the Balkans and complete control of the entrance to the Adriatic.

The population is just over a million, and natural resources are few, though oil is produced in small quantities by Italian companies. The chief importance of the country is strategic.

Albania is to a large extent Muslim, and its occupation caused widespread indignation in the Muslim world, with which Albania has many links. The Egyptian Royal family is of Albanian origin, and Albanians always played an important part in Ottoman public life in the old days. It is reported that ex-King Ahmed Zog has offered his services to the Turkish army.

(2) The Great Powers and the Balkans

German (or rather Austrian) and Russian interests in the Balkans are traditional. Already in the eighteenth century the Austrian Emperors steadily pushed their frontiers forward in the Balkans, and in the decades immediately preceding the last war the Germans took over the task of expansion, drawing up, as is their wont, an elaborate scheme of German economic and military progress towards the warm waters of the Mediterranean. In 1913 alone three distinct plans were published, and studied avidly in Germany. One of them provided for the "geographico-commercial direction" by Germany of the line Heligoland-Baghdad. Another for a German Central and East European confederation as protrectress and coloniser of Asia Minor, a third for German administration of the Balkans and Near East in a war against England. This last aim was to a great extent achieved during the Great War. Serbia and Roumania, both allies of the Western Powers, were overrun and placed under complete German control, while Turkey and Bulgaria, as German allies, were fitted neatly and firmly into the German scheme of things. It was the Allied attack on the German-dominated Balkans through Greece and Salonica that contributed to a great extent to the German overthrow. The Salonica expedition

demonstrated in a striking fashion the value of sea-power, which made it possible to use bases on the Mediterranean coast for an attack on an enemy-controlled continent.

The defeat of the Central Powers and the break-up of Austria-Hungary put an end for some years to the Germanic drive towards the Aegean and Black Seas. Trade between Germany and the Balkan States continued on a large scale, but the direct threat to Balkan independence remained in abeyance until the emergence of a new and aggressive Germany under Adolf Hitler. It was made immediate by the annexation of Austria and the resumption of the historic Austrian objectives. Germany now touches Yugoslavia, approaches Roumania, and by her virtual control of Hungary has secured a position in the very heart of the peninsula. By occupying the Balkans, Germany would acquire important sources of supply. Moreover, by securing positions on the Aegean and Black Seas, she would be able to challenge British sea-power in the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East, to threaten the Dardanelles and menace Istanbul and Turkey. The Balkans are Germany's route to the Black Sea and the Ukraine, to the Straits and the Suez Canal, to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf; in a word, to the control of three continents and to world power. It may be added that these ideas are openly advanced in German reviews and periodicals.

The first step was economic. The agrarian economy of the Balkan States is naturally complementary to German industry. More than half of the foreign trade of the Balkans is with Germany and the amount is probably increasing. The German system of barter and clearing-arrangements deprives the Balkan States of the possibility of extensive trade with countries with a free economic system, and makes them ever more dependent on Germany. The very debts owed to them by Germany form an additional bond. Payment can only be made in German goods, which are delivered in quantities far exceeding local requirements. Already the Balkan States are so well stocked with German aspirins and

razor-blades that they have ample means at their disposal to adopt one of two remedies for the distress caused by their economic position.

Another important instrument is the German population of the Balkans. Most of the Balkan kingdoms have German minorities of varying size. These are carefully organized on Nazi lines, and form a kind of State within the State. They are in the main active agents of Nazi Imperialism, and play an important part in the attempt to subjugate the Balkans. Among their chief activities are the stirring up of racial and social hatred which, by weakening the political structure of the countries, helps to make them ever more dependent on Germany.

In all these schemes Turkey has an important part. Lacking any naval strength in the area, Germany must follow Napoleon in using the land route to the Further East, across Turkey and Iran. Turkey is the bridge across which German troops would march from the Balkans to Asia and Africa. Action against the Soviet Ukraine—which, be it not forgotten, is one of the most frequently proclaimed objectives of German expansion—could only be effective if Germany dominated the entrances to the Black Sea, now controlled by Turkey. Turkey is thus an essential link in the German chain, and must pass under German control if Hitler's plans are to be realized.

Turkey is fully aware of this danger. Her position is far stronger than that of the Balkan States. Unlike them, she has not allowed herself to become fettered to the German economic system, but has retained full independence of action. Militarily and politically stronger than they, she is also better placed for receiving immediate assistance from other Powers, and is well capable of defending herself. Turkish policy in the Balkans has been to organize collective resistance to any threat of this kind. In what manner this was done, and with what success, we shall see later.

. . . . .

Another Power with a long tradition of Balkan ex-

pansion is Russia. Already at the beginning of the 18th century a Russian army under Peter the Great fought the Turks in Bessarabia. Despite an initial setback, Russian influence advanced steadily during the 18th and 19th centuries. The Christians of the Balkan Peninsula were mostly of the Greek Orthodox Church, and many of them were Slavs. Successive Russian governments sedulously fostered a feeling of religious and racial kinship between the Balkan Christians and the Russians, and gained considerable cultural influence. Russian help was of great value in securing Serb and Bulgarian independence. The historic objective of the Tsars was the city of Constantinople, the possession of which would give them a free outlet to the Mediterranean and full control of the entrance to the Black Sea. The annexation of Tsargrad, as they called it, was one of the Russian aims during the last war.

The old rivalry between Germans and Slavs was a powerful factor in favour of the Russians as against the Austro-Germans, and may yet prove so again. The Slavic rulers of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, despite their dislike of the Soviet form of government, still have a strong feeling of kinship with Russia, and it is doubtful if they would ever co-operate willingly in any German drive against that country.

In 1917 the Empire of the Romanoffs fell, as did the Austrian, German, and Ottoman Empires after it, and for a while Russia withdrew from Balkan politics. The Russian province of Bessarabia, which was acquired from Turkey in 1812 and which has a partly Roumanian population, was annexed by the Kingdom of Roumania. It is interesting to note that at the time, in the midst of civil war and revolution, all sections of Russian opinion were united in refusing to recognize this annexation, despite the acceptance of the loss of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States. A Russian Liberal is said to have remarked : "As far as I stretch out my hand to the right, I cannot reach the monarchists : as far as I stretch my hand to the left I cannot reach the Bolsheviks ; but on the question of Bessarabia we walk arm in arm."

In the years following the last war, Russian influence in the Balkans was negligible. Fear of Communism and social revolution overshadowed racial kinship in Balkan courts and parliaments, and what pan-Slav feeling existed was lavished on White Russian exiles, whose influence, in Yugoslavia at least, was at one time quite strong. Roumania in particular lived in daily fear of a Russian attempt to recover Bessarabia, and in 1936 a Roumanian Ministry fell largely through its advocacy of a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet.

The German threat to the Balkans, with its implied threat to Russia, has recently caused a renewal of Russian activities. Trade and political relations with Bulgaria were improved, and Russian influence is now reported to be considerable in that country. In May this year a trade pact was signed with Yugoslavia and in June diplomatic relations were resumed for the first time since the Revolution. On June 26th, at 10 p.m., M. Molotov handed the Roumanian Minister in Moscow a Note demanding the immediate cession to Russia of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina. The Russian demands were accepted on the following day, and the provinces occupied by the Red Army. It is interesting to note that the Russian demands included not only Bessarabia but also the former Austrian province of North Bukovina, which, though inhabited by a partly Ukrainian population, had never actually been Russian. These annexations can only be intended to strengthen Russia's position in the event of a future German attempt to fulfil the Ukrainian programme of Mein Kampf.

A more recent arrival to the Balkan arena is Italy. Since the Venetians were expelled by the Turks from the Adriatic and Aegean islands some centuries ago, Italy has had little to say in Balkan affairs. It is not until 1918 that the first signs of a new Italian policy appear. Italian claims on the Dalmatian coast which had once belonged to Venice were vigorously asserted, and although the region has only 18,000 Italians as against 611,000 Slavs, it was regarded as *Italia Irredenta*. Italo-Yugoslav relations were for long distinctly un-

friendly, and the agreements of Rapallo (1920) and Rome (1924) regulating the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, failed to allay mutual distrust. From 1923 onwards, Italy, under the Fascist Government, assumed a much more 'dynamic' policy, and tried to fill the place vacated by Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula. Friendship was sedulously cultivated with Albania, a weak and small State likely to fall under Italian domination, and Bulgaria, a defeated State of the last war, in a discontented and irredentist mood. It was hoped to use these two countries to further Italian schemes.

In August 1923, following an incident on the Greco-Albanian frontier in which an Italian General called Tellini and four of his staff were murdered, Mussolini made his first attempt at a strong-arm policy. An ultimatum was presented to Greece, and the Greek island of Corfù occupied by the Italian Navy. In those days, however, international order still counted for something, and after a Greek appeal to the League of Nations the Italians withdrew from Corfù and the question was settled by discussion[1].

In 1926, a treaty was made with Albania, the terms of which assured a virtual Italian Protectorate over that country. Friendly relations were fostered with Hungary and Bulgaria, both discontented Powers, and useful against Yugoslavia. After several years of simmering hostility, Italo-Yugoslav relations almost reached breaking point in 1934, when Italian complicity was suspected in the murder of the Yugoslav King Alexander in Marseilles. The general distrust and fear of Italian intentions in the Balkans was shown once more in 1935-36 when all the Balkan States participated in sanctions against Italy, despite the serious loss of trade incurred.

The creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October 1936 much weakened the position of the Balkan States, and compelled them to adopt a more friendly attitude to Italy. In March 1937 an Italo-Yugoslav Agreement was signed, and, with the disappearance of Austria and

[1] As we go to press a repetition of this incident seems to be taking place.

Czechoslovakia, the break-up of the Little Entente and the growing solidarity of the Axis, Balkan resistance to German and Italian encroachments became ever weaker. In 1939, on Good Friday, Albania was invaded and occupied by the Italians, and the Balkan nations found with horror that Italian troops were in the Peninsula, within striking distance of their main centres. Yugoslavia was now cut off and encircled, and Greece directly threatened. Britain and France reacted with a guarantee of Greece and Roumania. Turkey feeling herself directly menaced, agreed to enter into negotiations with Great Britain, and on May 12th a Joint Declaration was issued in London and Ankara providing for common Anglo-Turkish action in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean. A parallel Franco-Turkish Declaration was signed the following month.

Of British and French policy in the Balkans there is little to say. In the old days of the Ottoman Empire, British and French interests were centred mainly in the Southern and Eastern provinces and were little concerned with the Balkans. The chief British preoccupation in the Balkans was to prevent undue expansion by any great Power, and to forestall any threat to Istanbul and the Dardanelles. French policy in the post-war years was rather more active. An elaborate system of alliances was built up, including Yugoslavia and Roumania, and for some time these States relied on French support to hold off the Italians. The murder of M. Barthou in 1934 and the accession to power of M. Laval opened a period of Franco-Italian co-operation, and in recent years French political influence has dwindled rapidly. The disappearance of Czechoslovakia may be said to have brought it to an end. French cultural influence is still considerable, and both Britain and France have important investments in Balkan countries. Among Balkan nations there is much sympathy for the Allied cause.

(3) Inter-Balkan Relations

For some years past Turkish policy has been directed to the formation of a Balkan bloc strong enough to

withstand agression from outside. A first step was taken in 1930 when a non-aggression pact was signed between Greece and Turkey. This was followed in September 1933 by a treaty of guarantee and mutual assistance. Although this treaty was directed in the first instance against possible Bulgarian demands, it provided a basis for a wider understanding. In the words of a distinguished Turkish writer: "Turks, like the English, face facts realistically. They let bygones be bygones, especially if bygones hamper their adjustment to life. And bygones usually do that. The Greco-Turkish friendship rests on this basis. It is common-sense that makes us friends with the Greeks, it is realism which makes us see that a Greece convinced of the necessity of Turkish friendship for her own sake is a safe Ally."

Meanwhile other ancient Balkan rivalries were being set at rest. Treaties were signed between Greece and Roumania (Geneva, 1928), Greece and Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1929). Roumania and Yugoslavia had been Allies in the little Entente, which was reaffirmed in 1933. From 1930 onwards a number of inter-Balkan conferences were held on various questions, and a spirit of more active collaboration began to appear. Finally a Balkan Pact of Mutual Understanding was signed in Athens on February 9th, 1934, by Yugoslavia, Greece, Roumania and Turkey. The Statutes of the Pact were formally adopted in Ankara in October-November of the same year. They provided for mutual guarantee of Balkan frontiers and for consultation in the event of any threat to the common interests of the signatories. Both Greece and Turkey afterwards stipulated that the Pact was not to involve them in war with any Great Power. Both Albania and Bulgaria, though invited, refused to join the Pact, the former under Italian influence, the latter because of her unsatisfied claims against several of the signatories.

In many quarters the Balkan Entente was regarded primarily as a defensive League against Bulgarian revisionism, and some doubts were cast upon its value in the event of a threat from the outside. Certainly the Bulgarian question was of some importance. Bulgaria,

twice defeated, had lost much territory and had many claims, several of which were not unreasonable. A hostile Bulgaria in the heart of the Peninsula made effective Balkan co-operation impossible, and offered a constant temptation to any predatory Great Power with ambitions against the integrity of the other Balkan States. Many attempts were made to bring Bulgaria into the Pact. In 1933, a meeting was arranged between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav kings, and a temporary lessening in the tension between these two kindred nations followed. On January 24th, 1937, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria signed a Pact of Perpetual Friendship, and on July 31st, 1938, Bulgaria signed at Salonica a Pact of non-Aggression with all four members of the Balkan Entente. The Pact was, however, limited in scope. Bulgaria did not renounce her claims, but merely promised not to seek a revision of frontiers by force. The problem of Bulgarian irredentism is by no means settled.

In its early days great things were expected from the Balkan Entente. Turkey, the leading Power of the group, and the one which had taken the initiative, aimed at creating a solid Balkan bloc which would stand united in the face of any aggressor.

> The frontiers of the Allied Balkan States constitute one sole frontier, and those who have designs on these frontiers will be struck as if by the rays of the sun.[1]

Again :—

> The perfect harmony and strength of the unbreakable bonds that unite us can be held up as the finest example of international collaboration.[2]

For some time the Entente seemed to work well enough, despite the absence of Bulgaria. Meetings were held twice yearly, and a common attitude adopted on such questions as the Italo-Abyssinian War and the Spanish Civil War. In recent years, however, the Entente has weakened considerably. German economic policy in

[1] Message of K. Atatürk to General Metaxas.

[2] Speech of Dr. Rüshtü Aras in Ankara on the occasion of the visit of the Roumanian Premier.

the Balkans has rendered independent action increasingly difficult, while the Italian 'forward' policy in the Mediterranean has brought new danger. The annexation of Austria in 1938 and of Albania in 1939, coupled with the virtual exclusion of French influence from the Balkans has much worsened the strategic position of both Greece and Yugoslavia, the latter of which is now completely encircled. The return of Russia to the Balkan arena brought further complications, the first evidence of which is to be seen in the recent absorption of Bessarabia.

The growing weakness of the Balkan kingdoms made the position of Turkey even more important. Turkey alone is free from the economic and strategic weakness of the Balkan States, and the task of leadership has been falling to her to an ever increasing extent. Already in 1939 Turkey took the initiative in entering into close relations with the Western Powers. In October and November 1939 Italian attempts to create an Italian-dominated League of neutral States in South-Eastern Europe were watched closely in Turkey. The *Tan*, of Istanbul, wrote in its issue of October 28th, 1939 :

> Turkey is vitally interested in maintaining the Balkan Entente founded by Atatürk. The events of recent months have much weakened the Entente; Roumania is not in a position to resist German pressure; Greece and Yugoslavia see themselves constrained to follow Italian policy. Only the reinforcing of the Balkan Entente with the active participation of Turkey could give to a bloc of seventy million people the strength to resist any external Imperialist aspirations and safeguard peace in the Balkans. Turkey should therefore summon a Balkan Conference in Ankara, inviting Bulgaria, too, and prevent the holding of such a conference in Rome, such as several Balkan States already seem disposed to accept.

At the beginning of this year the Turkish Press in general devoted much space to the Balkan situation, and stressed the importance of the Turkish factor in Balkan politics. On January 26th the *Tan* again referred warningly to Italian designs, and reasserted the necessity of Turkish aid for the maintenance of Balkan peace. Finally, on February 2nd-4th a meeting was held at Belgrade, which was attended by the Foreign Ministers of the four members of the Balkan Pact, and a joint communiqué was published, including the following points of agreement : (1) Extension of the Balken Entente for a further statutory period of seven years, as from February 9th, 1941 ; (2) Maintenance of close contact between the four Foreign Ministers until the next meeting of the Permanent Council, which is to take place in Athens in February 1941. Other articles relate to the strengthening of economic and political bonds between the signatories, and the adoption of a common attitude in the face of the European War.

Meanwhile efforts were made to improve Turco-Bulgarian relations. In March 1939 the Bulgarian Prime Minister visited Ankara and speeches of friendship were exchanged. In January 1940, B. Numan Menemencioğlu, the Turkish Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visited Sofia and had discussions with the Bulgarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. In interviews with the Bulgarian and Turkish Press he expressed his satisfaction with the results achieved. It was reported that the Bulgarian Prime Minister made it clear that Bulgaria would not lend herself to any attempt to put pressure on Turkey from the North. This improvement in relations was confirmed a few days later in an exchange of telegrams between the Turkish President and the Bulgarian King. On January 23rd the Bulgarian Foreign Minister gave a special interview to the Turkish Press and reaffirmed the strictly neutral policy of his country. The Turkish Foreign Minister stopped in Sofia and conferred with his Bulgarian colleague both on his way to and from the Balkan meeting in Belgrade in February. In the same month Bulgaria began commercial discussions with both Roumania and Yugoslavia, and agreements were signed. In April and May statements were made in the Bulgarian. Press and Parliament affirming the good relations between Bulgaria and her neighbours, especially Turkey.

The events of the last few weeks have, however, caused a change for the worse. The architects of the Balkan Entente had not forseen the possibility of a return of Russia to the Balkans, and had even accepted the Soviet definition of the aggressor at Geneva in their statutes of this pact. The Soviet annexation of Bessarabia thus found them unable to offer a joint front. Moreover the German drive had completely changed the situation. In many quarters the Soviet intrusion was welcomed as a valuable counterblast to German encroachments, and the remaining Balkan States decided not to endanger their good relations with Russia in order to secure a larger area of Roumania for German economic domination. Turkish and Yugoslav relations with the Soviet remain friendly. The amputation of Bessarabia naturally raised once more the question of other demands on Roumania, and both in Hungary and in Bulgaria claims were again asserted. In the latter country the Soviet move was received with enthusiasm, and revisionist claims are again much to the fore.

It was generally assumed that Italy's entry into the war would be the signal for a joint Axis attack on the Balkans, especially on Yugoslavia and Greece. So far this danger has failed to materialize—thanks largely to the firm stand taken by Turkey and to the knowledge that any Italian attack in that quarter would meet with a vigorous resistance.

The further outlook in the Balkans seems uncertain. Roumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia seem to be hovering uneasily between Germany and Russia, the former tending towards Germany and the latter two tentatively angling for more effective Russian support. Axis policy for the moment is to prevent any outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans—a contingency which would considerably reduce their vital supplies from that area and much increase the danger of a Russo-German clash. The recent visits of the Roumanian and Bulgarian Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers to Berlin, at Hitler's summons, are symptomatic of Germany's efforts to bolster up her tottering influence in South-Eastern

Europe and to prevent any immediate outbreak. At the moment of writing the German plan would appear to be to force Roumania to make concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria and thus to create a German dominated bloc, of the three countries. This would serve the double purpose of (a) encircling Yugoslavia and (b) providing a buffer against Russia. How far this policy will be successful depends largely on the Soviet reaction. Meanwhile Roumania has rejected the British guarantee and would seem to be adopting a generally unfriendly attitude to this country.

To Turkey it is becoming clear that the Balkan bloc is a thing of the past, and that henceforth Turkey must rely on herself and her western Ally to preserve her independence, and with it the vital land bridge from Europe to Asia and Africa from German attack. In the words of the *Yeni Sabah* of Istanbul (June 17th, 1940), the peace prevailing in the Balkans is due to a temporary agreement between the neighbouring Great Powers, and is intended merely to postpone the fate of the Peninsula until accounts with the Western Powers have been settled. In view of the unexpected difficulty which Hitler is encountering in his camapign against England, he may yet decide to attack through the Balkans and the Near East. Turkey will then have to play a role of critical importance.

CHAPTER VI

TURKEY AND THE GREAT POWERS

"The Government of the Republic comes to-day to seek from the representatives of the Nation their permission to take position and proceed in unity with England in a co-operation of peace, defence, and security which is not directed against any country, is not intended to encircle or harm any country, and aims only at saving the nations from the tragic consequences of war. . . ."

Dr. Refik Saydam.
Speech to the Great National Assembly in Ankara, May 12, 1939.

"The offensive implications of the policy of encirclement have assumed a new and more precise character against Italy with the recent Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish agreements."

Dr. Virginio Gayda.
Giornale d'Italia, July 20, 1939.

"The Anglo-Turkish agreement is directed against Italy, just as the Anglo-Polish agreement is directed against Germany."

Völkischer Beobachter, May 13, 1939.

For nearly two centuries most of the great Powers of Europe had been steadily approaching on the Ottoman Empire—annexing or liberating one province after another, bringing new branches of Turkish economic life under their control, securing for themselves ever greater privileges in the very heart of the Empire itself. In the second decade of the present century things came to a head. Germany had shown herself more dangerous to Turkish independence as an ally than as a foe, and even England, the traditional defender of Turkish integrity, was in league with other Powers to partition and destroy the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres was not calculated to endear the Great Powers to Turkey, and even at Lausanne, after the victorious conclusion of the war of independence, the Turks found their demands were resisted at every point. For some years Turkey was as an outlaw among the Powers. One great Power alone was not associated in the conspiracy. In Russia, a revolution had for the moment reversed the whole direction of policy, and the new rulers in Moscow offered a hand of friendship which was readily accepted.

In spite of its initial unpopularity, the Turkish Republic started well in the field of international affairs. Alone among the defeated Powers of the last war, Turkey refused to accept a dictated peace, and succeeding in obtaining a treaty on what were virtually her own terms. For some years Turkey maintained correct if cold relations with most other States, and after a while began to build up a system of friendships and pacts which assured her position with her neighbours and gave her a

leading place both in South-Eastern Europe and in the Middle East. The studied correctness and moderation of Turkish policy also resulted before long in much improved relations with the Great Powers. In 1932 Turkey joined the League of Nations, and in 1934 was elected to the Council. She was a signatory of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and of other international arrangements. The question of the Straits was also submitted to international discussion, and, as we shall see later, was peacefully settled at a Conference in 1936.

We may now sketch briefly the course of Turkish relations with the various Great Powers up to the outbreak of war.

(1) Russia

Since the first contacts between Russia and the Ottoman Empire the main pivot of Russo-Turkish relations has been the question of the Straits. Despite her vast area Russia has comparatively few ports on the open sea. Both on the Baltic and on the Black Sea in Europe her coastline fronts a closed-in sea, the entrances to which are controlled by other Powers. After a steady course of expansion which gave her control of the Northern and Eastern shores of the Black Sea, Russia found herself face to face with the Power that controlled communications between that sea and the Mediterranean and through it with the open ocean. The whole of Russian history during the 18th and 19th centuries is dominated by the urge to secure freedom of access to the Mediterranean. As long as the Black Sea was dominated by Russia and the Straits or entrance to the Black Sea by Turkey, hostility between the two Powers was almost inevitable, and Russo-Turkish wars followed each other with monotonous regularity.

In 1918, however, the position was completely changed. Istanbul and the Straits were no longer in possession of a comparatively weak Turkey, but were occupied by the powerful naval nations of the West, then taking up an attitude of open hostility to the new rulers of Russia. A weak Turkey in possession of the Straits merely hin-

dered Russian communication from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. A great naval power in control of the Straits was in a position to attack the Russian Black Sea ports from the Mediterranean. It was clear which was the greater danger from the Russian point of view. The threat was driven home during the years 1919-1920, when White Russian forces fighting the Soviets in the Black Sea area received material assistance from the Western Powers. It is thus not strange that when a Turkish nationalist leader rose who was prepared to resist to the utmost the Allied attempt to impose their domination on Turkey and on this important channel of communication, the Russians welcomed him and at an early stage endeavoured to establish friendly relations with him. With the withdrawal of British troops from Transcaucasia and the defeat of Denikin's White armies in that area Reds and Kemalists met. On their first territorial contacts there were slight clashes, but the basic identity of interests of the two parties soon showed itself, and relations of the most cordial character were established. The first Bolshevik diplomatic mission was received in Ankara with enthusiasm and was followed by an economic mission. On March 16th, 1921, a treaty was signed in Moscow between the Kemalist and Soviet Governments, the preamble to which shows the new spirit of friendship that was now actuating these age-old enemies.

> The Government of the Turkish Great National Assembly, and the Socialist Federal Republic of the Russian Soviets, recognizing with one accord the principle of the liberty of nations and the right of every nation to dispose freely of itself, taking into consideration the common struggle which both peoples have undertaken against the intervention of imperialism and foreseeing that any difficulties which would arise for one party would render critical the position of the other, have decided to sign an agreement to assure friendly and fraternal relations between the two countries.

The agreement provided for a regulation of frontiers

and for full co-operation in various respects. The question of the Straits was postponed, the two signatories agreeing

> To hand over the final drawing up of an international statute governing the Black Sea and the Straits to a special conference of delegates from the Littoral States, on condition that the decisions made by the conference should not infringe the full sovereignty of Turkey or the security of Turkey and her capital, Constantinople.

Soviet material assistance was of great value to the Turks in their war of liberation, and this gesture of friendship in times of trouble from a Power who had long been regarded as an hereditary enemy was deeply appreciated. The friendly relations then established have lasted with few interruptions up to the present time.

Besides the Straits there is another question which is of some, albeit lesser, importance in determining the course of Russo-Turkish relations. The rich Soviet district of Transcaucasia, as we have already seen, lies within easy striking distance of Turkey and is vulnerable to attack by Turkey or by another Power allied to Turkey. The Turkish and British occupations of Transcaucasia in 1919 and 1920 showed how easily the province could be attacked. Moreover, Transcaucasia is inhabited in part by people of Turkish race and language, and the possibility of an irredentist movement in Turkey has for long been in Russian minds. The defence of Transcaucasia thus also urged the Soviets to establish close and friendly relations with the Turkish Republic, and the Treaty of Moscow, 1921, was followed immediately by supplementary agreements between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet Republic.

The first chill in Russo-Turkish relations came at the Conference of Lausanne in 1923. The Allies were no longer in control of the Straits, and, with a strong Turkey in firm possession of the Dardanelles, the old rivalry between the possessor of the garden and the possessor of the gate seemed about to reassert itself. The Soviet

delegation was treated slightingly at the Conference and a draft convention was drawn up without their participation. Despite a protest by M. Chicherin, the Turks signed the new Straits Convention on July 24th, 1923. Turkey and Russia still had far too much in common against the Western Powers for the temporary chill to be lasting, and on August 14th the Soviet Government accepted the new situation. The convention provided that the Straits were to be kept open for warships under certain reservations, and that two narrow zones on both shores of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be demilitarized.

During 1924-1925 Turkish relations with England became much strained over the Mosul question,[1] and Turkey once more began to feel herself treated as an outlaw by the Western Powers. A new strengthening of the bonds of friendship with Soviet Russia was the natural consequence, a new Russo-Turkish Treaty being signed in Paris on December 17th, 1925, by M. Chicherin and Dr. Rüshtü Aras, then Turkish Foreign Minister. The Treaty provided for friendly neutrality in case of any military attack or hostile alliance by a third party or parties against either signatory, and for the settlement of all disputes by friendly arbitration. The Treaty was originally signed for five years. It was prolonged for a further five years in 1930, and again for a further ten on the 7th November, 1935. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet of Moscow on March 29th this year M. Molotov reaffirmed "the unshakable will of the Soviet Union to fulfil the reciprocal obligations arising from this Treaty."

In 1936 the successful adventure of Italian Imperialism in Abyssinia and the failure of sanctions, as well as the remilitarization of Germany, led Turkey in the interests of her own security to demand a revision of the Straits Convention embodied in the Treary of Lausanne. This Turkish demand was supported by the Soviet Republic, which felt that its relations with Turkey were sufficiently friendly to make a strongly armed Turkish control of

[1] See Chapter IV.

the Dardanelles preferable to freedom of the Straits, which might allow an attack by a naval power on the Russian Black Sea ports. At the Conference summoned at Montreux to consider the question, Russia claimed special consideration as being the Power with the largest interest in the Black Sea. There was for a while some conflict between the Russian viewpoint and the British demand that the Straits should be either equally open or equally closed to the warships of all nations. After some negotiation a compromise was agreed upon and signed on November 9th, 1936. It is interesting to note that Italy refused to participate in the Montreux Conference and did not accept its decisions until May 2nd, 1938, after the signature of the ill-fated Anglo-Italian Agreement. The raising of the Straits question at Montreux once more caused a temporary difference of opinion between Turkey and Russia which was soon outweighed by the factors of common interest.

On April 28th, 1939, M. V. Potemkin, the Soviet vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara and stayed there until May 5th to confer with the Turkish Government. He was received by the President and had a number of discussions with the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. A communiqué issued after the meetings stated that "during this re-establishment of contact between Turkish and Soviet statesmen it was noted and demonstrated once more that there exists between the two friendly Governments a coincidence of views on international questions and on the special questions concerning Turco-Soviet relations. The two neighbouring and friendly countries are decided to reinforce once more the strong bonds that unite them and that constitute a valuable contribution to the cause of peace to which both are firmly attached." The communiqué concluded with an affirmation of the determination of the two Governments to continue friendly relations and to remain in constant contact for the exchange of all information of a political nature touching their common interests.

At the time of the signature of the Anglo-Turkish and

Franco-Turkish preliminary agreements in May and June, 1939, it seemed that an Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement was imminent and that Turkish relations both with Russia and with the Western democracies would fit into one system. Even the conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression Pact did not at once disappoint these hopes, and as late as August 24th the *Tan* expressed the opinion that the conclusion of the Pact was exclusively a measure intended to hold Germany and that it would not prevent the conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance. The outbreak of war imposed on the Turkish Government the necessity of making vital decisions.

(2) ITALY

During the later Middle Ages there was a considerable territorial and commercial expansion in the Near East by the Italian maritime republics, and especially by Venice. The Turkish conquests, however, put an end to their influence, and it is not until the present century that Italy reappears as a Near Eastern Power. The first advance was in 1912 when an unprovoked Italian attack on Turkey resulted in the cession to Italy of the Turkish province of Libya in North Africa and the military occupation by the Italians of the Dodecanese Islands off the Turkish Aegean coast. This war marked the first appearance of Italy as a colonial Power with Near Eastern ambitions, and it began a tradition of development which has continued almost without interruption until the present day. It began, too, a tradition of Turkish distrust of Italian intentions. The secret treaties signed between the Allied and Associated Powers for the partition of Turkey during the last war provided for the occupation by Italy of a substantial slice of Turkish territory. The Treaty of London of 1915, which more or less embodied the terms on which Italy consented to enter the war on the side of the Allies, provided for the establishment of full Italian sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands and for the cession to Italy of a zone in Anatolia including the district of Antalya, in

the event of a partition of Turkey. A later agreement signed at St. Jean de Maurienne on April 20th, 1917, extended these areas and allotted to Italy the best part of South-Western Anatolia, including the towns of Antalya, Konya and Smyrna. These agreements were embodied in a somewhat modified form in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and Italian troops actually began the occupation of part of the zone allotted to them.

The rise of the Turkish Nationalist movement, however, coincided with the period from 1919-1922, when Italy was under a Government of a retreatist and pacific character, which was not disposed to further the imperialist schemes of its predecessor. Italian troops were withdrawn from Turkey at an early stage and no serious attempt was made to enforce Italian claims. A promise was made to cede the Dodecanese Islands, excepting Rhodes, to Greece, and Rhodes itself was to be handed over fifteen years later provided that Britain did the same with Cyprus. The year 1923, however, saw the emergence of a new and aggressive Government in Italy. The Corfù incident to which we have already referred was an example of the new temper of Rome. The Dodecanese Islands were formally annexed, the previous arrangement being ignored, and one of them, the island of Leros, was later fortified as a submarine and air base. During the '20's Italian policy in the Near East was, however, on the whole not aggressive. The setback which Mussolini had received in the Corfù incident showed him that the time was not yet ripe for a forward policy, and he waited for a number of years before embarking on further adventures. Italo-Turkish relations in the '20's were fairly friendly, and the Anglo-Turkish dispute over Mosul served to prevent any Italo-Turkish disagreement. In 1928 an Italo-Turkish Treaty of friendship was signed, and in 1930 the good offices of Italy were accepted in improving Greco-Turkish relations. Afterwards, in 1932, an Italo-Turkish Agreement was signed regarding the sovereignty of the Dodecanese Islands and the delimitation of territorial waters.

In the '30's, however, we find the rulers of Italy in a

new mood—one far more inimical to the peace and independence of the Near East. Unlike the other signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Italians could not forget the rich spoil that had eluded their grasp, and Italian journalists and political writers were constantly harping on the theme of Italian claims and constantly complaining that Italy had been robbed of her lawful prey. Such statements were not calculated to cause confidence in Turkey, and Turkish distrust of Fascist intentions grew steadily throughout the '30's. A typical example of Italian writings on the subject can be found in a book of Santi Nava published in 1931 which contains a detailed scheme for the mass settlement of Italian peasants in Turkey as well as in Syria and Transjordan.[1] In a speech made on the 18th March, 1934, at the second Quinquennial assembly of the Fascist regime in Rome, Mussolini made the following remarks[2]:

> The historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia and Africa. South and East are the cardinal points which must awaken the interest and will of the Italians. In the North there is little or nothing to be done, nor again in the West; neither in Europe nor beyond the ocean. These objectives of ours have their justification in geography and in history. Of all the great Western Powers of Europe, the nearest to Africa and to Asia is Italy. A few hours of sea voyage, even less of air voyage, are sufficient to join Italy to Africa and to Asia. Let there be no misunderstanding as to the scope of this centuries-old task which I assign to this and to future generations of Italians. There is no question of territorial conquests—and let this be understood by all, both far and near—but of a natural expansion which will lead to a close co-operation between Italy and the peoples of Africa; between Italy and the nations of the Near and Middle East. It is a question of an action which must make the most of the still unknown resources of the two continents, especially of Africa, and place them more firmly in the circle of world civilization. Italy can do this: her position on the Mediterranean, a sea which is resuming its historic function of link between East and West, gives her this right and imposes on her this duty. We do not intend to claim monopolies or privileges, but we demand and wish to obtain that those who have arrived already, the satisfied ones, the conservatives, do not busy themselves in blocking in every way the spiritual, political and economic expansion of Fascist Italy.

[1] *Il problema dell'Espansione Italiana ed il Levante Islamico.* Padua. 1931.

[2] *Scritti e Discorsi di Benito Mussolini.* Vol. IX. Milan, 1935.

These remarks, which were characteristic of the new trend of Italian policy, caused deep dismay in the regions assigned for this natural expansion. Nor did the Duce's insistence on the non-aggressive character of this expansion help to allay suspicion. The spiritual expansion of Fascist Italy in Abyssinia in 1935 and 1936 brought the danger nearer to Turkey and the other threatened countries. In 1936, Turkey, together with the other States of South-Eastern Europe, joined wholeheartedly in the application of sanctions. The Spanish Civil War temporarily diverted Italian attention to the Western Mediterranean. Even that, however, did not leave Turkey entirely unaffected. In August, 1937, the sudden submarine campaign against Mediterranean shipping spread to Turkish waters, and two Spanish ships returning to Spain from Russian ports were torpedoed near the entrance to the Dardanelles. Kemal Atatürk, suspecting, not unreasonably, that the submarines had come from the Italian base in the Dodecanese, returned at once to Ankara from army manœuvres and after discussion with his cabinet issued a declaration to the effect that in future any foreign submarine found without leave in Turkish waters would be sunk. This firm Turkish action was the first to be taken against the submarine menace, and led shortly after to the summoning of the Nyon Conference which effectively ended it.

During 1938 and 1939 relations between Turkey and Italy tended to be correct despite frequent claims voiced in the Italian Press and frequent expressions of distrust in the Turkish Press. In February and March, 1939,

several Turkish newspapers devoted considerable space to the danger of Italian aggression and the scope of Italian schemes of expansion. This Turkish Press campaign reached such a point that the semi-official *Ulus* of Ankara published an article deploring it and expressing its disapproval of these "attempts to disturb the friendly relations between Italy and Turkey." Another Turkish objection was to the character of the broadcasts made in the Turkish language from the Italian station of Bari, and on March 10th the *Tan* accused Italy of conducting anti-Turkish propaganda in these broadcasts.

The Italian attack on Albania in April 1939 once more revealed the danger in tangible form and renewed the fears that had been aroused by early Italian pronouncements and by the Abyssinian campaign. This time the attack had come to the Balkan Peninsula itself and Italian armies were within striking distance of Turkish territory. It was this act of aggression which led directly to the opening of Anglo-Turkish negotiations. In the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister addressing the Great National Assembly on July 8th, "the occupation of Albania, a country without foodstuffs or raw materials, without mines and without fertile fields, made us decide to strengthen the peace front, abandoning our policy of neutrality. It was then that we made the well-known common declaration with the English. Since that moment our policy of internal and external peace has not changed. We have joined ourselves to the peace front for the express purpose of reinforcing peace."

The signing of the Anglo-Turkish preliminary agreement in May 1939 was attacked in both Germany and Italy as a measure directed against the latter country, and the *Völkischer Beobachter* exclaimed with unwonted truthfulness "the Anglo-Turkish Agreement is directed against Italy just as the Anglo-Polish Agreement is directed against Germany." While the Turkish Government maintained that the agreement was in no way directed against any Power, several Istanbul newspapers did not fail to point out its value in resisting Axis aggression, in the words of one of them "because Fascism is

Imperialist, because Fascism is warlike, because Fascism does not respect international obligations, because Fascism aims at dominating and occupying Turkish territory just as Germany aims at dominating it economically."

The Franco-Turkish Agreement of June for the transfer of the Sanjak of Alexandretta from Syria to Turkey occasioned further Turco-Italian polemics. An article in the *Tribuna* of Rome of June 17th attacked the cession as illegal and denied vigorously the Turkish right to the area. On July 10th the Italian Government submitted a formal note to the French Government protesting against the agreement and reserving the right not to recognize it. This Italian action caused considerable indignation in Turkey. The *Yeni Sabah* of Istanbul pointed out that the Italian interest in self-determination of peoples apparently did not extend to the Dodecanese Islands; it maintained that inasmuch as these were inhabited by Turks and Greeks and therefore belonged to Turkey and Greece, Italy, who had seized them during the period of Turko-Greek dissensions, should now restore them to these two countries, which could no longer tolerate the presence of a foreign Power in a point of vital importance to their communications. Similar statements were made in other Turkish papers and even in the semi-official *Ulus*. Dr. Virginio Gayda, better known as the mouth-piece of Mussolini, published in the *Giornale d'Italia* of July 27th, 1939, a violent attack on the Turkish Government, and, accusing her of joining the Anglo-French policy of encirclement, threatened Turkey with dire consequences. The extensive military dispositions made by Italy in the Dodecanese, which had been represented as a threat by Italy against Turkey, were described by him as "the necessary defence of Italy against Turkish aggression, for long encouraged secretly by France and Great Britain, and now openly revealed by the Turks themselves."

(3) Germany

In our chapters on Turkey and the Balkans and on the economic life of Turkey we have already dealt to a con-

siderable extent with Turco-German relations. It remains now to sum up briefly the main issues at stake and to note the chief points of interest in these relations during the last 20 years.

If Turkey commands the sea route from Russia to the Mediterranean, she also commands to as great an extent the land route from Germany to Asia and Africa. The narrow crossing from Istanbul in Europe to Haydar Pasha on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus is the bridge across which German influence and, after it, German armies would march from Germany through the Balkans to world domination, if Hitler's plans are to be realized.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century plans were already being made in Germany for the use of this road to glory. The famous project of the Baghdad Railway was intimately connected with it, and the steady increase in German influence in the Ottoman Empire up to the outbreak of war in 1914 was directed to no other end. Up to the last war it seemed to many Turks that the main danger to their integrity came from the Russian threat to burst through to the Mediterranean. The scope of the German threat to burst through to the Middle East was not yet realized, and German aid against Russia was welcomed. The Ottoman Empire served as a base for German action in the whole of the Middle East. A whole series of German "Lawrences" were despatched from Turkey to Iran and Afghanistan, where they rendered valuable service to the German cause by stirring up trouble and dissension against the British.

Already during the last war the Turks began to regret having thrown in their lot with Germany. Relations between Turkish and German officers and civilians were often unfriendly, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was among those who led the Turkish movement against German interference.

The defeat of the Central Powers put an end for the moment to this German vision. General Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission in Turkey, concludes his memoirs of the last war with an interesting passage in which he describes the illusions held by

Germany on the value of the Middle Eastern route—illusions which he said recalled to him the tales of the Thousand and One Nights and the mirages of the Arabian desert.

During the period of the Weimar Republic, Germany seemed to have given up her schemes of world conquest and resumed friendly commercial relations. In the words of a German commentator writing early in 1932:

> The great German banks re-established their branches at Constantinople and firms and contractors got energetically to work. Relations with Germany have developed very smoothly *as there has been no question of any suspicion with regard to the political aspirations of that country.*[1]

German cultural influence increased in Turkey on the whole and German trade reached appreciable figures.

With the rise to power of Hitler, however, the situation changed once more. The old schemes of world conquest were retrieved from the Hohenzollern waste-paper basket, and the high road to Baghdad across the Bosphorus once more figured largely in German plans. The German campaign in Turkey took two forms—propaganda and economic penetration. In 1936 Dr. Schacht, in 1937 Baldur von Schirach, in 1938 Dr. Funk visited Turkey. The many military links surviving from the last war were carefully exploited. Turkish students in Germany were subjected to intensive propaganda, and an elaborate system for the dissemination of German propaganda in Turkey was set up. The method of economic penetration which had proved so successful in the Balkans was tried in Turkey too, and although the results achieved were by no means comparable with those in South-Eastern Europe, the Turkish trade balance with Germany was raised enormously.

The Turks, however, reacted vigorously. As soon as the threatening character of German economic policy was realized, steps were taken to meet it, and, as we have already seen, a large part of Turkish trade was trans-

[1] Dr K. Krüger "Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East." 1932.

ferred elsewhere. A speech made by Dr. Goebbels at the Stuttgart Congress of Germans living abroad, in which he referred to Turkey as one of the countries in which National Socialism had made the greatest progress aroused violent indignation in that country. The Turkish Press almost unanimously protested vigorously against any such suggestion, and one paper in particular pointed out that Turkey had no intention of allowing herself to become once more, as in 1914, the docile instrument of German Imperialism.

For a while it seemed that the creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis might lessen to some extent German interest in the Near East. In the words of one French commentator, Mussolini was to be appointed Consul in charge of German interests in the Mediterranean zone. It was soon seen, however, that Germany had no intention of relinquishing her own objectives in favour of her ally, and there has been no diminution of direct German activity. Moreover, the annexation of Austria has brought Germany a stage nearer to the Orient and has given her a new junction on the Berlin-Baghdad Railway.

In April last year Germany showed her special interest in Turkey by appointing the notorious von Papen as her Ambassador at Ankara, at the suggestion of von Ribbentrop. It is interesting to note that in 1918 von Papen served in Turkey as Chief of Staff of the 4th Army under the orders of Liman von Sanders. The Anglo-Turkish Agreement of May not unnaturally caused some dissatisfaction in Germany and was condemned severely by the German Press as an aggressive measure. The cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey provoked hostile comments in Germany as well as in Italy, although Germany made no official representations on the subject. In July an Arabo-German Union was founded in Berlin and with German approval held a meeting of protest against "the sad persecution suffered by the Arabs in Turkey." It may be noted in passing that but three years earlier, during the period of Turco-French hostility over the Sanjak incident, the German Press had expressed its whole-hearted support of Turkish claims.

During the months immediately preceding the war the attitude of the Turkish Press was on the whole unfriendly to Germany and tended to present the Anglo-Turkish Agreement as a measure of protection for Turkey against possible axis aggression.

(4) FRANCE

The French were the first among European nations to establish friendly relations with the Turks. Early in the sixteenth century Francis I, King of France, created a scandal among the Christian States of Western Europe by sealing the so-called pact between the Crescent and the Lilies, and for long after the King of France enjoyed the first place among European Powers in the good offices of the Turkish Court. French cultural influence in Turkey survived the breakdown of French political and economic influence. Even to-day European culture in Turkey means in the first instance French culture, and European education usually takes a French form. French is still the European language most current in Turkey and is the *lingua franca* of Pera, the cosmopolitan suburb of Istanbul. Many Turks are educated in French schools and colleges both in Turkey and in France, and French books and films are widely appreciated in Turkey.

During the period since the last war, however, French direct interests in Turkey have been limited and the French share in Turkish economic life, for example, has been considerably less than that of Russia, Britain, Germany, or even Italy. Such relations as existed were between Turkey and France in her capacity as mandatory power for Syria rather than between Turkey and metropolitan France. The Franco-Turkish Agreement of 1921, which established friendly relations between France and the Kemalist Government, seemed to make a promising start and for a while the Turks actually received material aid from French sources. This contact was not followed up, however. Two further agreements of a purely formal character followed in 1926 (for the delimitation of the Syrian frontier) and in 1937 (regulating commercial exchanges between the two

countries). In the years following 1936 Turco-French relations were much embittered by the Sanjak incident, to which we have already referred elsewhere. This was, however, finally settled and in June 1939 a Turco-French Agreement completed the Turco-British Agreement of May, thus forming a joint Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact against aggression in the Near East. The re-establishment of traditional friendly relations between Turkey and France was received with much satisfaction in both countries.

(5) Great Britain

English relations with Turkey are almost as old as those of France and are also based on a long tradition of friendship. It is said that the defeat of the Spanish Armada was welcomed by the Turkish Government, and an English Ambassador to Turkey, writing in the seventeenth century, makes the following observations:

> Of all the Princes so far remote as *England*, none amongst this people (the Turks) stands in better account than His Majesty of *Great Britain*, not only for the convenience of the Trade, which provides this Empire with many necessary commodities; but for the fame of his Shipping, and power at Sea, which makes him, though divided from all parts of the World, yet a borderer on every Country, where the Ocean extends: And this esteem and honour the *Sultan* bears towards His Majesty, hath been evidenced in several particulars.

During the nineteenth century the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was a firm principle of British foreign policy, and in the Crimean War English, French and Turkish troops fought side by side in defence of it. We have it on Turkish authority that this long tradition of friendship and the memory of comradeship in arms are still alive among the Turks.

The first quarter of the present century was a period of temporary hostility between the two countries. The growth of German influence in Turkey under Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks necessarily resulted in an

estrangement between Turkey and England, and the last war found them on opposite sides. During the years 1918-1923 England was the leading Power in the group attempting to impose a humiliating settlement on the defeated Empire, and it was with English encouragement and support that the Greeks undertook their ill-fated campaign. Even after the Treaty of Lausanne, Turco-British relations remained under a cloud and were embittered by the Mosul controversy with Turkey until 1926. The settlement of the affair in an Anglo-Iraqi-Turkish Treaty in that year brought about an improvement and Anglo-Turkish relations grew more friendly in the years that followed.

It is not, however, until the '30's that we find England and Turkey coming once more into close collaboration. The growing Italian threat in the Mediterranean tended to stress the community of interests between the two Powers, both of whom were directly affected by the new Roman Imperialism. The period of close collaboration began with the application of sanctions against Italy in 1935-36, a measure in which Turkey co-operated unhesitatingly. The Conference of Montreux once again saw friendly Anglo-Turkish discussions on an important question of mutual interest and strengthened the ties binding the two peoples. The official visit paid by King Edward VIII to the Turkish President in autumn of that year provided an interesting outward sign of the new spirit of cordiality. It was followed by the visit of Ismet Inönü to London for the coronation of George VI. In 1938 steps were taken to strengthen the economic links between Turkey and Great Britain. A British credit of £16 million sterling was granted to Turkey and a number of important contracts given to British firms by Turkey. On May 12th, 1939, a joint Anglo-Turkish declaration was issued, to the effect that pending the conclusion of a definite and permanent agreement between them "the British and Turkish Governments in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area would co-operate effectively and lend each other all the aid and assistance in their power." This paved the way to

the formal Treaty of Alliance signed in October last year.

The other events of the months preceding the outbreak of war may be dealt with briefly as follows. In January 1939 Dr. Rüshtü Aras, a former Foreign Minister, was appointed Turkish Ambassador to the Court of St. James. This appointment indicates the importance which Turkey attached to relations with England. Early in June military missions were exchanged. A British military mission visited Istanbul and Ankara and inspected among other things the defences of the Dardanelles, while a Turkish mission led by General Orbay came to London. It was followed shortly after by a delegation of Turkish journalists led by the Director of the Turkish Press, B. Burhan Belge. Early in August, British battleships paid visits to Istanbul and Smyrna at the invitation of the Turkish Government; the Turkish Press welcomed the British fleet as "guardian of the Mediterranean," and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was received by President Inönü and had conversations with the General Staff. It is interesting to note that the port of Smyrna is normally forbidden to all foreign warships, and the invitation to British naval units to visit it was thus a new departure. The feeling of the Turkish people on the subject of the resumption of close relations with England is perhaps best expressed in the following passage from a leading Turkish writer already quoted.[1]

> Here is a typical conversation which took place between a Turkish boatman and a Turkish intellectual on the Bosphorus. It was the day the papers had announced the signing of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance.
>
> The boatman said: "The papers say that the English are our allies now, and I hear the French are, too. It sounds like the Crimean War."
>
> "What do you know about the Crimean War?"
>
> "Grandfather fought in it."
>
> "Do you approve of the present alliance?"
>
> "I do."
>
> "Why?"

[1] "Turkey and her Allies." By Halidé Edib. *Op. cit*

> "Because there may be war, and a great war at that. Naturally we will be in danger. We need allies. Our Government was wise."
>
> "Do you forget what those countries did to us after the last Great War?"
>
> "I don't." He was evidently loath to consider two things at a time. He rowed silently for a moment, then stopped. Putting his hands on the oars he spoke with the graveness which characterizes the Anatolian: "You see, we have strong enemies. In every great war someone wants to take our country. Those who want our country now are not the English or the French. Those who want Turkey are the enemies of the English and the French now. So they will have to stick to us."
>
> He resumed his rowing, and added in a matter-of-fact tone: "We are always here to defend our Hearth and Home."
>
> The last sentence illustrates the general outlook of the common people if ever and whenever they are faced with a dangerous complication. . . . And the strength of our foreign policy to-day rests on the same popular backing which sees safe allies in the democratic nations because of our common danger and because of memories of the Crimean War still passed on from father to son. Though an alien propaganda centre efficiently spreads anonymous leaflets about the ill-will of our present allies, and about what they did to us after the Great War, and about how much better it would have been for us if we had chosen the opposite camp, the people simply shake their heads and go on approving thoroughly of Ismet Inönü's foreign policy.

Turkish Foreign Policy since the outbreak of war.

The outbreak of war in September 1939 placed Turkey in a dilemma. The Turks had hoped that an Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement would render their own agreements with Russia and with the Western Powers complementary and would enable Turkey to take her place in a united front of Peace Powers. The conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact shortly before the outbreak of war seemed for the moment to destroy

these hopes and to impose on Turkey the necessity of making a choice between her two groups of friends. There was, of course, no question of her siding with Germany ; Turkish friendship with the Soviet, however, was, and remains a fundamental principle of foreign policy and early in September it might well have seemed that a policy of alliance with The Western Powers was likely to disturb this friendship.

The Turkish attitude to the war was clear from the start. As a leading Turkish statesman said in private conversation towards the end of September : "We Turks are a nation with a strong historical sense. We know quite well that a partition of Poland is a threat to Turkey." The German campaign in Poland did not, however, bring the Anglo-Turkish Agreement into operation and the attitude of the Turkish Government was formally stated by the Prime Minister on September 11th, "Our relations with the two parties at war are normal. . . . Our relations with Germany conform to international rules. Between us and Germany there is no question of direct difference. . . . Our relations with Poland have always been friendly and without incident. . . . With England and France we have an association of interests and principles on a basis which is known to you. . . . We are out of the war to-day. Let us hope that this war does not show developments which will extend to our country. The measures taken in certain parts of our country are purely precautionary. . . . Our relations with the neighbouring U.S.S.R. are friendly and will remain friendly (applause)."

Meanwhile the signing of the full Anglo-Franco-Turkish Alliance was postponed while an attempt was made to conclude a similar pact with Russia. On September 21st the Foreign Minister, B. Shükrü Sarajoğlu left for Moscow where he stayed until October 17th. There are conflicting reports as to the character of his discussions there with the Soviet Government, but the results must on the whole be considered unfavourable. The official Soviet *Tass* agency announced that there had been a detailed exchange of views on the

relations between the two countries conducted in a cordial atmosphere, and they had once more affirmed the friendly Turco-Soviet relations and common desire for peace. B. Sarajoğlu on his return made a similar statement to journalists, and added : "I am convinced that this visit was useful because it was the occasion for new manifestations of friendship. In the course of my visit I was able to admire among other things the Metropolitan Railway and the Volga Canal, which are an honour to the nation that built them." Shortly after, however, the Turkish Prime Minister addressed a meeting of the Parliamentary Group of the Republican People's Party and explained why it was that the discussions in Moscow had not resulted in an agreement. "The negotiations," he said, "have been broken off because the Soviet Republic has advanced new proposals to our Minister. It was not possible to reconcile these new proposals with the obligations that have been incurred between Turkey on the one hand and Great Britain on the other with the knowledge of the Soviet Union. Furthermore the guarantees offered to us were not sufficient to compensate for the obligations that we were asked to accept in return. Moreover the Russian demands were irreconcilable with Turkish policy regarding the Straits. Turkey considers it an essential point not to accept any obligations other than those deriving from her international engagements. For this reason it was not possible this time to bring to a conclusion the Turco-Russian nogotiations in Moscow, but our relations with the Soviet Union remain as in the past, on a basis of friendship." In his speech on October 31st at the 5th Session of the Supreme Soviet, M. Molotov, too, referred to the Turco-Russian negotiations. From Turkey, he said, the Soviets had asked for a bilateral pact of mutual assistance limited to the Black Sea and the Straits. They stipulated that the conclusion of such a pact should not in any way involve measures likely to lead them into armed conflict with Germany and, moreover, that Turkey should not permit the passage through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea of warships

belonging to non Black Sea States. Turkey had refused to accept these two proposals. M. Molotov concluded by pointing out the difference between the Turkish policy of support for England and France and the Soviet policy of strict neutrality, and expressed the hope that Turkey would not one day regret her decision.

Despite the temporary disagreement with Russia, Turkey did not attempt to withdraw from her obligations to the Western Powers, and on October 19th, two days after the return of B. Sarajoğlu from Moscow, the tri-partite Treaty of Alliance with France and Great Britain was signed in Ankara. The chief articles are as follows:

1. In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, the French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom will co-operate effectively with the Turkish Government and will lend it all aid and assistance in their power.

2. (i) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power.

(ii) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, France and the United Kingdom will collaborate effectively with Turkey and will lend it all aid and assistance in their power.

3. So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Roumania by their respective declarations of April 13, 1939, remain in force Turkey will co-operate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.

The treaty was to remain in force for fifteen years. In addition to the Treaty, two Protocols were signed, the

first providing that the Treaty should be put into force from the moment of its signature, the second stating that:

> The obligations undertaken by Turkey . . . cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, *or involving as its consequence*, entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.

The Pact made a tremendous impression all over the Middle East and was welcomed enthusiastically in Egypt, Iraq, Palestine (both by Jews and Arabs) and even in Syria. Balkan comment was more reserved, as fears were expressed in some quarters that the Pact might involve Turkey, and therefore the Balkan Entente, in war. These fears were set at rest at the Balkan Conference in February, of which we have already spoken.

During the months that followed the outbreak of war close military and financial relations were established with the Western Powers. As early as the second week of September General Weygand visited Ankara. In October a Turkish military mission was in England. In December B. Menemencioğlu, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visited London and Paris, and on January 8th, 1940, a financial and commercial agreement was signed between Turkey and the Allies.[1] At the end of January General Weygand was again in Ankara, and shortly after a company of Turkish journalists visited France and explored the Maginot Line. On April 17th a French military mission visited Turkey and on May 7th a new Turkish official mission left for London, including two generals, an admiral, members of Parliament and leading journalists.

Meanwhile, relations with other Powers were improved. After the temporary disagreement of October more cordial relations were restored with the Soviet Union, and the Balkan Pact was confirmed in Belgrade in February 1940. Relations with Germany and Italy remained correct, but it is interesting to note that according to Turkish official figures exports to Germany

[1] See Chapter III.

in the first two months of 1940 form 2 per cent of the Turkish total as against 58 per cent in 1939.

The entry of Italy into the war brought about a change in the position. In the normal course of events this action would have involved the automatic entry of Turkey. During the days that followed, however, circumstances changed so rapidly that precipitate action on the part of Turkey seemed unwise. The collapse of France on the one hand and the more forward policy being pursued by Russia both in the Baltic and in the Balkans made some hesitation seem desirable. On June 26th the Prime Minister stated in the Great National Assembly that the Government had decided on the application of the ruling of Protocol II of the Treaty and had made the necessary notification. Turkey thus preserved her attitude of non-belligerency. On the following day it was revealed in Ankara that the Government's decision to maintain non-belligerency was reached on the day that Italy entered the war. It was their belief that Mussolini entered the war only because he was practically certain that France was going out of it. It seemed to them not unlikely that Mussolini's entry was made by arrangement with certain parties in France with a view to the subsequent *coup d'état* of Pétain. Meanwhile, certain measures were taken. On June 12th commercial relations with Italy were broken off. A number of classes were called up for military service and artisans in the Istanbul district were conscripted to complete the Dardanelles fortifications.

In July Germany made a determined effort to spoil the friendly relations existing between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Documents were published purporting to show that a joint Anglo-Franco-Turkish attack had been planned on Russia and the Transcaucasian oil-fields. This was officially denied by all concerned, and in a letter to the Turkish Foreign Minister the French Ambassador stated "in no conversation which I have had . . . with you . . . did I ever ask authorization for French 'planes to fly over Turkish territory to bomb Baku. You never gave authorization for such an operation."

Rumours were also circulated to the effect that the Soviet Government had sent Turkey an ultimatum demanding territorial concessions. These rumours were officially denied both in Turkey and in Russia. On July 12th the Turkish Prime Minister spoke of these rumours and said "there is only one reply to those who, on the basis of documents so published, accuse Turkey and try to compromise Turkish statesmen who will not serve their designs. It is to treat them with scorn."

Some uncertainty, however, remains as to Russian intentions. Soviet policy in the Baltic and the Balkans in recent weeks has given rise to suspicion that further demands may yet be presented, and in the circumstances the Turkish Government felt it wise to apply Protocol II and not enter the war on the grounds that such a step might possibly lead to a conflict with Russia. Further Turkish action will thus to a large extent be determined by the Soviet attitude. Meanwhile Turkey remains non-belligerent and is expressing in various ways its support of the Allied cause. The economic importance of this has already been noted. The establishment of friendly relations between Russia on the one hand and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other has been welcomed in Turkey as providing a safeguard against a further extension of German influence, and the Turkish Press of late has stressed the identity of Turkish and Russian interests. The position was perhaps best expressed in a recent issue of *Tan*[1], which pointed out that Russia had wished to keep the Dardanelles closed because she feared an attack by France and Great Britain. France had now ceased to count and Britain was fully occupied with her own defence. This removed Russian suspicions that Turkey might allow the British Fleet to enter the Black Sea. It was now established that Britain had not had any offensive designs against Russia and an Anglo-Soviet understanding was therefore possible.

[1] July 16th.

CHAPTER VII

THE STRATEGIC AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY

"How curious is this city of Istanbul : for one copper coin one can be rowed from Asia Minor to the land of the Franks."
Tursun Beg (fifteenth century Turkish writer).

"My dear Friends,

"The Army, the Turkish Army ! . . . A glorious name that fills the nation's heart with confidence and pride. . . . The Turkish Army is the unity, power, skill and patriotism of our nation embodied in steel.

"Our army is the invincible defender of Turkish territory and the guarantee of the systematic effort we display for the realization of our ideals."
Remal Atatürk, Ankara, 1937.

LYING at the South Eastern corner of a German dominated continent of Europe, Turkey occupies a key position. She is in touch at once with the Balkans, Russia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The importance of the Straits will already have emerged to some extent from what has gone before. The Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, known together as the Straits, command all sea communication between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. They form the bridge of Germany's route to the East, and outflank any egress which Germany might at any time acquire on the Aegean or Black Seas. They are now under full Turkish sovereignty and their fortifications are believed to be impregnable. The position of the Straits has been changed many times in the long history of the Eastern Question and is now regulated by the Montreux Convention of July 20th, 1936. This regulated the passage of warships and merchants ships in peace time, in a war in which Turkey is neutral, and in a war in which Turkey is belligerent. If Turkey is at war, or likely to become so, she may close the Straits to warships or may permit their passage at her discretion. If Turkey is neutral, belligerent ships are excluded with certain exceptions. No large fleet of a non-Littoral State can be sent into

the Black Sea in time of war except on the express invitation of the Turkish Government. Soviet warships, on the other hand, can be sent out into the Mediterranean. If Turkey is belligerent, enemy ships have no right of passage. In peace time there is little or no restriction on the passage of light vessels, though capital ships are excluded except in the case of Black Sea Powers. Moreover, only Black Sea Powers have the right to send submarines. In war-time, non-belligerent States remain under the peace-time regulations. Belligerent ships, however, are excluded, except (1) those sent in fulfilment of obligations arising from the League of Nations, and (2) those sent in fulfilment of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance binding Turkey.

Besides the Straits, Turkey has the Anatolian harbour of Smyrna and the recently acquired port of Alexandretta, the strategic importance of which has already been pointed out. Turkey now has direct rail communications with Russia through Erzerum, and the recently completed Baghdad Railway established direct communication between the Bosphorus and the Persian Gulf through Turkey and Iraq. The weakness of the Baghdad Railway is that it passes at certain points through Syrian territory, notably at Aleppo. It remains to be seen what measures would be taken in an emergency to meet this flaw in Turkish communications.

The Dardanelles, the district of Chatalca on the European frontier of Turkey, and the Caucasus are forbidden zones, and extensive fortifications are ready to meet any drive against these points. The port of Smyrna, too, is closed to foreign warships, and the Anatolian coast is well defended against any possible attack.

1. THE ARMY

The military qualities of the Turkish people are well known, and the Turkish army contains some of the finest fighting material in the world. It is, moreover, imbued with a new spirit of national revival, the spirit that led it to its striking victory in the War of Independence. The approximate peace strength of the Turkish army is

20,000 officers and 174,000 other ranks, organized in ten army corps. Military service is for eighteen months, and begins at 21. Liability for service lasts for 25 years. The annual contingent is of about 175,000, of whom half are called up. Officers are trained at the Military College at Ankara. This Turkish Sandhurst was founded over a hundred years ago, and was transferred to the new capital some four years ago. University graduates on entering the army do a special course of training as reserve officers consisting of six months' general military training, six months in an officer cadet training unit, and six months as officer cadets with the army. They are demobilized with the rank of 2nd lieutenant. This system provides Turkey with a large reserve of officers who can be called upon in the event of general mobilization. There are no professional soldiers. Professional officers are trained from an early age. They are educated at military secondary schools, from which they proceed to the college in Ankara. The Turkish army performs a valuable educational task among its conscripts, a number of whom are illiterate on mobilization. Elementary education forms an essential part of the conscript's military training, and the demobilized Turkish peasant returning to his village forms an important element of cultural advancement.

(2) THE NAVY

The Turkish navy contains one battleship, the *Yavuz*. This vessel, formerly the *Goeben*, is of pre-war construction. It was rebuilt in 1928. There are also two cruisers and a fair number of destroyers, torpedo-boats and submarines. The naval personnel is in the neighbourhood of 10,000. Service in the navy is for three years. Naval officers are trained at the naval college of Heybeli Ada, in the isles of the Bosphorus, and the course consists of secondary education followed by three years' naval training of which the first is at the college and the remaining two on warships. The Turkish navy is concentrated in the Sea of Marmora and has the important naval base of Izmit as its headquarters.